Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 18 November 2018

Abstract and Keywords

This article connects issues in the philosophy of perception¾and in particular the question of whether perception of the external world is direct or mediated by sense data¾with issues in the philosophy of time, in particular the question of whether the passage of time is to some degree an illusion. Contrasting theories in the metaphysics of time are considered, such as presentism (the view that only the present is real) and the B-theory (the view that our experience as of the passage of time merely reflects our temporal perspective), and the question raised whether the argument for sense data based on the time lag involved in perception rests on metaphysical assumptions about time. Recent research on time illusions (i.e. misperceptions of temporal aspects of stimuli) is put in the context of these philosophical problems.

Keywords: time, passage, illusion, sense data, presentism, B-theory, time lag

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.