- The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science
- The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
- About the Contributors
- Multicausality, Context‐Conditionality, and Endogeneity
- Historical Enquiry and Comparative Politics
- The Case Study: What it is and What it Does
- Field Research
- Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible?
- From Case Studies to Social Science: A Strategy for Political Research
- Collective Action Theory
- War, Trade, and State Formation
- Compliance, Consent, and Legitimacy
- National Identity
- Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict
- Mass Beliefs and Democratic Institutions
- What Causes Democratization?
- Democracy and Civic Culture
- Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches
- Rethinking Revolutions: a Neo‐Tocquevillian Perspective
- Civil Wars
- Contentious Politics and Social Movements
- Mechanisms of Globalized Protest Movements
- The Emergence of Parties and Party Systems
- Party Systems
- Voters and Parties
- Parties and Voters in Emerging Democracies
- Political Clientelism
- Political Activism: New Challenges, New Opportunities
- Aggregating and Representing Political Preferences
- Electoral Systems
- Separation of Powers
- Comparative Judicial Politics
- Coalition Theory and Government Formation
- Comparative Studies of the Economy and the Vote
- Context‐Conditional Political Budget Cycles
- The Welfare State in Global Perspective
- The Poor Performance of Poor Democracies
- Accountability and the Survival of Governments
- Economic Transformation and Comparative Politics
- Subject Index
- Name Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article looks at comparative studies of the economy and the vote and is divided into three major parts. The first portion provides a summary of the four important contributions of economic voting research. This is where the work on the American economic vote and economic voting are reviewed. The second portion suggests one methodological approach for analyzing the numerous existing surveys, modeling cross-national variation, and measuring the magnitude of the economic vote. The third and final portion provides a brief summary of the contextual theory of the economic vote from Duch and Stevenson, which builds the assumption of instrumentally rational voters.
Raymond M. Duch is Professor in Quantitative Political Science and a Professorial Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford.
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