Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 18 October 2017

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines the structure of self-consciousness in people with schizophrenia. The findings indicate that our self-experience is not neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of the self and that it is important to attend carefully to the experience of the subject in order to understand schizophrenia. The results also suggest that the variable disruptions in the sense of self-presence, first-person perspective, and the phenomenality of experience in schizophrenics directly affect the minimal self and it may also have implications for the narrative self.

Keywords: self-consciousness, schizophrenia, self-experience, self-presence, first-person perspective, minimal self, narrative self

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.