Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).

date: 20 November 2017

Abstract and Keywords

This article focuses on the debate on perception or intuition between Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein as constructed largely from ‘The Limits of Empiricism’ and ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’. In consulting several Nachlass items as written in 1935–1936, it shows, first, that Wittgenstein puts forward a detailed criticism of Russell's account of perception, as Russell presents it in the context of a discussion on causation. This criticism is interesting in that it leads up to an account of knowledge and certainty that foreshadows the position known from On Certainty. In addition, the article demonstrates that a crucial element in Wittgenstein's critique of Russell is similar to his critique of L. E. J. Brouwer's intuitionist stance in mathematics, a criticism that Wittgenstein expressed in the early 1930s. Russell presents an account of the relation between sense experience and knowledge that should produce propositions functioning as examples of our most immediate knowledge.

Keywords: Bertrand Russell, perception, intuition, Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Limits of Empiricism, certainty, L. E. J. Brouwer, causation, knowledge, sense experience

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.