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Abstract and Keywords

So long as we have the idea that what we want goes beyond the limit, resignation is in place. If, instead, we were to recognise that the idea that we were trying to ask something, that there was something we wanted to find out, or wanted to say, was confused, and that there was nothing that we were asking or wanting to say, there would no longer be anything to be resigned about. Thus ‘complete satisfaction’ would be possible. This article looks at Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and demonstrates the connection between Wittgenstein's ideas about marking out the limits ‘from inside’ and his ideas about philosophical method, as well as the connection between those ideas about method and the contrast between the two ways of understanding the limits of language. It also discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and what he thought it could accomplish. It is a mistake to argue that, of the various forms of philosophical solipsism, Wittgenstein is concerned only with solipsism of some particular type.

Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, resignation, satisfaction, limits of sense, limits of language, philosophy, solipsism

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