Abstract and Keywords

Presentism, roughly, is the thesis that only the present is real. The opposite view is eternalism or four-dimensionalism, the thesis that reality consists of past, present, and future entities. After spelling out the presentist's thesis more carefully, something can be said about why one might think it true. This article develops four prominent objections to presentism and says something about how the presentist might reply to each. There are no knock-down arguments for presentism, like most other substantive theses in philosophy, it cannot be established conclusively. It is, however, a natural position to take given certain metaphysical and linguistic commitments.

Keywords: presentism, eternalism, the presentist, metaphysical commitments, linguistic commitments, arguments

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