- List of Contributors
- Mental Causation
- The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
- Anomalous Monism
- Non‐Reductive Materialism
- What is Property Physicalism?
- What is the Physical?
- Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness
- Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
- The Explanatory Gap
- Phenomenal Concepts
- The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
- Intentional Systems Theory
- Wide Content
- Narrow Content
- Information‐Theoretic Semantics
- A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
- The Normativity of the Intentional
- Concepts and Possession Conditions
- The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
- The Content of Perceptual Experience
- Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
- The Self
- Unity of Consciousness
- Personal Identity and Metaphysics
- Language and Thought
- Consciousness and Reference
- Emotions: Motivating Feelings
- Intention and Intentional Action
- Folk Psychology
- Other Minds
- Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge
Abstract and Keywords
This article tries to situate the recent discussions of personal identity in their historical context. It begins with a brief discussion of Locke's account of identity as such, turning then to a more detailed account of his views on personal identity in particular. It then discusses a pair of problems that arise for any sort of neo-Lockean account, and surveys the sorts of responses that have been offered to them. Finally the article briefly presents three recent accounts, each of which can be seen as relying on a subtle re-characterization of the traditional problem of personal identity.
Philosophy, Yale University
Tamar Szabó Gendler is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Yale University.
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