- List of Contributors
- Mental Causation
- The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
- Anomalous Monism
- Non‐Reductive Materialism
- What is Property Physicalism?
- What is the Physical?
- Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness
- Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
- The Explanatory Gap
- Phenomenal Concepts
- The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
- Intentional Systems Theory
- Wide Content
- Narrow Content
- Information‐Theoretic Semantics
- A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
- The Normativity of the Intentional
- Concepts and Possession Conditions
- The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
- The Content of Perceptual Experience
- Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
- The Self
- Unity of Consciousness
- Personal Identity and Metaphysics
- Language and Thought
- Consciousness and Reference
- Emotions: Motivating Feelings
- Intention and Intentional Action
- Folk Psychology
- Other Minds
- Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge
Abstract and Keywords
Phenomenology, the movement, has contributed and continues to contribute much to the study of phenomenal consciousness as well as to understanding the role of intentionality in our conscious lives. This article, however, is not about intellectual history or methodological movements. So it is not about such contributions. There is nothing in this article about the movement (Phenomenology) but much about the property (phenomenology). The word ‘intentionality’ is a technical word for the feature of a mental state in virtue of which it is directed at or is about or represents something other than itself.
George Graham is a Professor Philosophy and Neuroscience at Georgia State University in Atlanta, Georgia.
Terry Horgan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His publications include ‘Mental Quausation’ in Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989); ‘Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion’ in Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1998); ‘Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem’ in Theoria 16 (2001); and ‘Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem’ in Erkenntnis 67 (2007).
John Tienson is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.