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date: 23 October 2018

Introduction

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter discusses the theme of this volume, which is the Cold War. The essays in this volume take note of the centrality between the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also offer a wide-ranging reevaluation of the Cold War based on innovative conceptual frameworks that have evolved incrementally over time in the field of international history. The authors stress the global dimensions of the Cold War; attempt to transcend the strict separation of the political, economic, and ideological; and consider cultural aspects of the Cold War and the synergy between domestic and international developments. The volume also considers the relevance of the history of human rights and the work of international non-governmental organizations as integral to the history of the global Cold war.

Keywords: Cold War, superpower rivalry, United States, Soviet Union, international history, human rights, non-governmental organizations, conceptual frameworks, cultural aspects

Few if any historical subjects over the past five decades have generated a voluminous scholarly literature of such high quality as that on the cold war. Particularly since the Soviet-American conflict's end in 1989, historians, political scientists, and their colleagues from multiple other disciplines from across the world have scrutinized previously inaccessible documents, whether declassified in the United States, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere in the “West,” or made available in once-thought forever closed Soviet, Eastern European, Chinese, and Third World archives, to explore the impact of the cold war on a global scale. The outpouring of new scholarship precipitated by the end of the cold war and demise of the Soviet Union since 1990 did not generate a consensus on traditional questions such as the causes and consequences of the cold war. Although fundamental debates that drove various historiographies perhaps became less vitriolic, they remain robust and illuminating. Yet the remarkable diversity, originality, and increasing breadth of the new literature, particularly the myriad studies exploring the ways in which countries on the periphery in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa shaped and were shaped by the conflict, have significantly enriched the field. As a result of the expansion in geographic, methodological, and archival inquiry, students and scholars alike have gained a far deeper and nuanced understanding of the extent and limits of the cold war era.

This Handbook offers a wide-ranging reassessment of the cold war based on innovative conceptual frameworks that have evolved incrementally over time in the field of international history. The cold war was a distinct period in 20th-century history that cannot be wished away, although some have tried. Yet albeit distinct, the cold war must be understood and evaluated within the broader context and contours of global political, economic, social, and cultural developments, some of which preceded the cold war and some of which persist to the present day and doubtless will continue into the future.

This contextualization of the cold war does not imply that the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union has lost its significance. The chapters in this volume universally take note of the centrality of this rivalry, as they should. The cold war, nevertheless, can no longer be owned by either one or both of these countries’ (p. 2) historical memory or historiography alone. It must be appreciated as global history, and as global history it reveals nuances, idiosyncrasies, and complexities obscured by more traditional accounts. The essays in this Handbook, accordingly, embed the cold war in national and transnational developments that were autonomous of, if almost invariably affected by, the particular policies and crises that represent milestones in the conventional historiography of the cold war. Those independent developments include global transformations in areas such as human rights, economic and cultural globalization, environmental transformations, and long-standing ethnic, religious, sectarian, and parallel conflicts with roots that extend back decades in time and anticipate end points that have yet to be reached.

Because of the volume's broad writ and our vision, we have not structured it along conventional chronological lines, nor did we solicit essays that focused on particular way stations and watershed moments throughout the history of the cold war. There are no chapters, for example, on the Iran, Greek, Berlin, Suez, Offshore Islands, Cuban missile crises, or multiple other crises that punctuate the historiography; SALT I, SALT II, START, or other arms control negotiations and treaties; the Marshall Plan, NATO, NSC-68, the New Look, or Détente; or even the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The volume's goal is not to provide new answers to the questions scholars have addressed all these many years, although on occasion it does. Accordingly, only indirectly do the authors engage such questions as what year marks the cold war's onset, whether there was a first and second cold war, and what if any opportunities were missed to end the cold war earlier, and how responsibility or “blame” for the start, expansion, and continuation of the cold war should be apportioned.

Instead, organized thematically, the volume offers innovative essays on conceptual frameworks, regional perspectives, cold war instruments, and cold war challenges. The result is a rich and diverse assessment of the ways in which the cold war should be positioned within the broader context of the “long twentieth century.” The individual chapters in this volume evaluate both the extent and the limits of the cold war's reach into world history. Rather than differentiate among the three levels of analysis, they synthesize them. Rather than distinguish between national and international histories, they merge them. Some of the essays call into question orthodox ways of ordering the cold war chronology, others present new insights into the global dimension of the conflict, still others reveal dynamics and phenomena obscured or even made invisible by traditional research strategies. Exploiting fully the archival trail but at the same time consciously taking a step back from it, they do not advance a single new mode of analysis; they should be read as welcome voices in the current and very healthy conversation about how most effectively and comprehensively to approach and understand this rich and complex period in global history.

Readers can thus acquire an awareness of the spectrum of approaches to the era from an outstanding variety of scholars trained in different historical sub-disciplines as well as steeped in different national historiographies. What is more, the essays not only encourage but also challenge readers to adopt a wider lens in their assessments of the period. This means without denying the salience of the state, moving beyond the (p. 3) nation state framework to situate processes of change within broader if less clearly identified or definable spaces. Those include local, regional, and global responses to the threat of nuclear war; the impact of decolonization; the rise of human rights; the concern for the environment; and comparable transnational concerns. In this regard the volume is positioned at the intersection of boundaries that divide many cold war histories and historians.1

Even though each essay offers a unique perspective on the cold war, all have been guided by three fundamental precepts. First, authors stress the global dimensions of the cold war. Some move the story beyond the US-Soviet rivalry to highlight the agency of other, primarily elite actors, among them Eastern and Western European leaders, alliance partners in the cold war system, and the leaders of non-aligned nations. Others give prominence to non-state actors in the international arena, including international organizations, activists, and intellectuals. Still others highlight transnational processes and developments that almost certainly would have occurred absent the cold war, but nonetheless were powerfully affected by cold war structures, products, and outcomes. There is no question that the cold war influenced economic, technological, environmental, and demographic changes as well as long-term processes such as decolonization, environmental transformation, and globalization. The challenge is to detect and document how, when, and why it influenced them.

A second precept guiding the essays is the effort to transcend the strict separation of the political, economic, ideological, and cultural aspects of the cold war. Even though the chapters emphasize one or another of the above considerations, they make clear important linkages among them. These essays thus mark an important step toward a global synthesis of the cold war. In other words, rather than continuing to argue along the lines of a causal hierarchy with either strategic/geopolitical, economic, or cultural factors trumping the others, the premise of the Handbook is that future scholarship will not so much present a competitive laundry list of the different influences on and drivers of the cold war as accept and recognize the reciprocal relationship among them.

The third precept underscores the synergy between domestic and international developments. Social, political, and economic transformations within a particular country affected the ways in which it acted in the international arena, and transformations in world affairs, in turn, affected domestic policies. Where appropriate, authors stress the ways internal political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics influenced political leaders’ and populations’ approach to the challenges of the cold war. By the same token, they analyze the ways in which cold war dynamics affected domestic policy, society, and culture. This synergy between international and domestic developments transcended the level of policy-making. For instance, the American civil rights movement was first and foremost a domestic event, precipitated by demands for racial justice in the American South and ultimately on the national level. But, as recent scholarship shows, civil rights activists drew significant parallels between their own struggle for racial equality and the struggle for decolonization in Africa. In addition, inspired by the decolonization movements in Africa, they utilized the platform of international organizations, such as the United Nations, to draw attention to their national campaign.2 Likewise, the social protest (p. 4) movements of the 1960s were at once local and global, committed with equal intensity to improving the living and learning conditions at particular universities and supporting national liberation movements in the Third World.3 The boundary between national and international environmental organizations was porous virtually from the start.4 The list goes on.

The essays at once address discreet aspects of the cold war and find connections among them through overlapping themes and developments. Collectively they liberate the cold war from the bipolar perspective without denying or minimizing the vital significance of that conflict. They succeed in contextualizing the cold war within global developments, such as modernization, globalization, and decolonization. While key moments in the formation, progression, and demise of the cold war still have a place in each specific essay, they make no claims to serving as the sole or even preferred way to narrate and analyze the cold war. These watersheds still comprise the scaffolding that makes the cold war such an extraordinary era in modern history, but by themselves they cannot adequately explain the varied transformations of this period. By calling attention to forces that run broader and deeper than the sum of these cold war conflicts, we can better understand the complexity and multi-dimensional facets of the period.

These broader forces can significantly alter our interpretation of the cold war's transformative moments and on occasion even lead us to new key moments that had previously been ignored. A global perspective reorders as well as reassigns the key way stations of the cold war. For instance, the question of the origins of the cold war, one of the core questions of cold war historiography, held significance primarily for Eastern and Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States. At the nexus between war and peace, between salvaging what was left of the war-ravaged European continent and creating a postwar world governed by a global rule of law and a clearly defined set of principles of peaceful coexistence, the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly distrustful of each other's motives and intentions for the postwar period. Even though the leaders of the main wartime alliance, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had first at Tehran and then at Yalta agreed on the general principles of the postwar world, their alliance proved fragile. Once the common enemy Nazi Germany had been vanquished, deeper fissures and the legacy of mutual distrust resurfaced. On the Soviet side, of course, this distrust was strengthened by the American refusal to share the secret of the atomic bomb with the Soviet Union or to place control over this powerful weapon with an international body, such as the United Nations.5

Many leading scholars of the cold war see this as a key moment in the deterioration of the US-Soviet relationship, and the contributors to this volume do not overlook it. Yet collectively the chapters provide evidence that it alone cannot explain the origins of the global cold war. They likewise demonstrate that the immediate postwar period can and should not be reduced to explaining the origins of the cold war. Indeed, a number of the chapters suggest alternative historical moments that deserve equal attention as shapers of the postwar international order.6

(p. 5) In doing so they are widening and to an extent repaving a road previously rarely taken by cold war historians but currently being travelled by scholarly pioneers. Among the alternative key moments that have largely been overshadowed by the scholarly focus on the origins of the cold war was the founding of the United Nations in October 1945. The United Nations Charter formulated a framework for international peace and security as well as a pledge for the defense of human rights. Alluding to the atrocities suffered in the recent world wars, the charter's preamble declared the United Nations’ determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”7

Both the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Charter and became founding members of the United Nations, along with forty-nine other nations from Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This demonstration of global unity was as real as the growing friction among the principal wartime allies. But rather than reconcile these contradictory narratives, historians for a long time dismissed one of them as a fleeting moment of idealism and privileged the other as what really mattered. In the literature, the founding of the UN was soon overwhelmed by the attention to contemporaneous events more aligned with the cold war narrative that rested on such pillars as the crises in Iran and Greece; the futility of the negotiations at the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, Moscow, and Paris; the abortive Baruch Plan to regulate and internationalize atomic energy (proposed at the UN, no less); and George Kennan's “Long Telegram,” Winston's Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech, Stalin's Election Speech, and the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine.

In recent years, however, cold war historians have begun to consider the history of human rights and the work of international non-governmental organizations as integral to the history of the global cold war.8 Even though the superpower conflict severely limited and at times circumscribed the United Nations’ ability to influence international relations, it nonetheless constituted a vital forum within the broader framework of global networks. Throughout the cold war, the United Nations Security Council and its General Assembly served as sounding boards that reflected the tension that existed between the spirit of internationalism and the bipolarity of the East-West conflict.

Two key events early in the cold war illustrate the entanglement of the UN in the increasingly tense East-West confrontation. The first was the Berlin blockade of 1948–9, which ended what little remained of the postwar cooperation among the four occupation powers of Germany and sealed the division of Germany into a Soviet controlled socialist East and a democratic West allied with the United States, Great Britain, and France. The source of the conflict had been the Western allies’ unilateral decision to institute a currency reform in the Western parts of Germany, a move that each of the occupying powers recognized would ruin the financial viability of the Eastern sector of (p. 6) Berlin, jointly administered by all four allied powers, and by extension the Soviet controlled occupation zone in East Germany. When the Soviet Union responded to the currency reform with a blockade of all traffic to and from Berlin, which of course was located within the Soviet zone of occupation, the US military responded with an airlift of vital goods to the Western sectors of the city. But no less importantly, albeit often neglected in the literature, the United States appealed to the United Nations in an effort to force an end to the blockade. The negotiations in the Security Council dragged on into the spring of 1949, when the Soviet Union gave up its blockade. To be sure, it was the success of the airlift and not the UN Security Council that ultimately prompted the Soviet Union to back down. Nonetheless, the United Nations provided the central forum for the expression and eventual resolution of the international dispute.

Two years later, the United States and its Allies again appealed to the United Nations to force a withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea. UN Security Council Resolution 83 in the summer of 1950 recommended military assistance to South Korea. Protesting the UN membership's refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China as the legitimate representative of China, the Soviet Union had been absent from the Security Council when that body passed the Korea resolution, and it did not officially get involved in the conflict (suffice it to say, it did lend unofficial support to the North Koreans).

The United States, on the other hand, furnished the vast majority of the UN force and led the military campaign against North Korea. China, however, which had turned communist in 1949, did engage the US-led UN forces, when, in the fall of 1950, General Douglas MacArthur crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea and threatened to move further into Chinese territory. The UN resolution, which authorized the international military action against the North Korean aggressor, the UN participation in brokering the cease-fire in the summer of 1953, and the role UN forces played in helping guard the demilitarized zone separating North from South Korea at the 38th parallel, gave the organization a prominent position in international affairs.9

We bring attention to the role of the United Nations in the Berlin Blockade and Korean War not for the purpose of replacing the conventional story. That story is central to the history of the cold war era. Rather, the aim is to supplement it by adding an additional layer, a layer that provides new insights even as it complicates the sequence of events. Similarly, the expansion of the cold war to the periphery in the late 1940s and especially the 1950s offers opportunities to explore alternative ways to appreciate salient dimensions of key moments in cold war history.

The traditional narrative focused on the incentives for both the Soviet Union and the United States to carry the cold war conflict into Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.10 From the United States vantage point, the expansion was a result of the perceived need to secure strategic outposts and resources, successive American administrations’ fear that the Soviets would exploit vulnerable emerging nations, and the domino-theory like thinking that posited that a Soviet beachhead could not be contained. From the Soviet vantage point, engagement in the so-called “Third World” offered the opportunity to advance the communist narrative of anti-imperialism, (p. 7) anti-colonialism, peaceful co-existence, and social justice against what looked like the latest installment in the Western world's grab for yet more territory, resources, and markets. Scholars exploring the Soviet and American side of the cold war in the Third World offered keen insights into the incentives, processes, and consequences of the cold war expansion, which did much to clarify our understanding of this period.11

Again, this narrative is unassailable. When exploring the cold war from the vantage point of the periphery, nevertheless, additional historical transformations come into sharper relief, chief among them the struggle for decolonization. To be sure, the cold war significantly shaped the emerging countries’ paths to independence in the 1950s and 1960s. It offered anti-colonial political activists powerful arguments in favor of independence and leverage to negotiate the terms of that independence. Still, rather than pitting one cold war camp against the other, most countries in the colonial world tried to forge a path of non-alignment. For them, the cold war rivalry between the two superpowers offered not just opportunities, but potential pitfalls as well.

These dynamics emerge much more vividly when taking into account events like the 1955 Bandung conference, where Asian and African nations as well as leaders from colonies on the verge of independence sought closer economic and political cooperation and a common strategy to fight colonialism and imperialism. The conference signaled the global South's effort to stake out a position of autonomy and strength in the cold war conflict without committing to one side or the other. One of the major results of the conference, the declaration of self-determination as the first right, underscored the claim to independence, both from the former colonial powers and from the influence and pressure of the two cold war camps.12

The Third World's interest in non-alignment did not mean a policy of non-engagement with cold war countries, nor did it prevent the practice of playing the superpowers off against each other in order to achieve maximum political benefits. To the contrary, one of the most skilled practitioners of this political maneuvering, able to take the greatest possible advantage from the cold war rivalry, was the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. He sought funds from both the Soviet Union and the United States to support a large construction project, the building of the Aswan dam to regulate the Nile River. He also struck an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, which set him on a collision course with the United States. Intricately interwoven with the Suez Crisis of 1956, one of the seminal moments in traditional accounts of the cold war in the Middle East, Nasser's skillful dealings with both superpower rivals and his eventual success in securing financial support from the Soviet Union for the dam project show that, even for leading figures in the non-alignment movement, siding with one side or another for short-term strategic objectives could be useful.13 Contemporaries of Nasser who sought to follow suit, such as Cambodia's Norodom Sihanouk and Indonesia's Sukarno, were far less successful.14

Moving beyond the US-Soviet cold war framework also reveals new fissures within each of the ideological blocs as well as new connections among domestic, regional, and geopolitical developments. Those include a greater emphasis on the Sino-Soviet split, but also the internal challenges to the cold war order in both the Soviet and the Western orbit. Historians of cold war communism have long stressed the importance of the (p. 8) ideological and political disagreements between Chinese and Soviet communists, but did not identify the rift as a substantial challenge to the cold war order. But it is vitally important to recognize the multiple subtle linkages that existed and expanded between the domestic desire for reform in each of the two camps and the evolution of the international objective of reducing political-military tensions through a policy of détente. For instance, we now understand the Chinese opening to the United States in the late 1960s in the context of the domestic dissident movements in Eastern Europe, particularly the Prague Spring of 1968.15

Likewise, the Federal Republic of Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in the early 1970s, often framed as a local or regional response to the US-Soviet policy of détente, had its roots in the early 1960s’ increasing disillusionment with the inflexible and ossified policies of the Konrad Adenauer government, as well as the increasingly vocal grassroots student movements that challenged the political status quo in West Germany. The proximity of the West German state to the Iron Curtain as well as the absence of official relations with East Germany provided additional incentives for the Social Democratic opposition to propose solutions to the cold war stalemate. The story of the emergence of détente has been well researched, but only recently have scholars begun to connect the political to the social and cultural story of the 1960s, and domestic to transnational upheavals in the cold war order.16 Drawing these connections was from its inception integral to this volume.

Recent historiographical developments have added more nuance and new perspectives to recognized milestones of the cold war. But they also reveal new plotlines that had remained obscured by the focus on the cold war strategic, economic, political, and ideological contest. Chief among these is the struggle toward the creation of a global human rights regime. Because most efforts in this direction were continuously thwarted by flare-ups in cold war confrontations or received only lip-service, and lukewarm lip-service at that, from the Soviet Union, the United States, and their respective allies, the efforts of rights activists have been pushed to the sidelines of the historical narrative of the cold war. However, prompted by a moment of supreme optimism for a fresh and decisive role for the United Nations after the end of the cold war, rights activists as well as their chroniclers discovered the potential of human rights as both a political cause and historical subject. Hence events like the crafting and signing of the Human Rights Declaration in 1948, the emergence and proliferation of non-governmental human rights organizations, the Helsinki accords of 1977, as well as the series of UN sponsored women's rights conferences since 1975, gained new prominence as salient moments in cold war history. What emerged then in the 1990s and 2000s was a history rich in alternative moments and milestones, rich also in exposing missed opportunities and failed efforts, yet nonetheless a history that needs to be taken into account as both a complement and counter-narrative to the dominant story of cold war confrontations.17

Another development that emerged boldly only after the end of the cold war was the attention paid to the history of globalization. It became a political buzz-word of the 1990s, associated with neo-liberalism, neo-imperialism, and neo-colonialism. Yet globalization also matured into a concept that attracted a wide variety of academic scholars (p. 9) from disciplines as diverse as economics, anthropology, sociology, political science, history, communications, and cultural studies. The academic exploration of the concept thus offered a welcome opportunity for trans-disciplinary synthesis that had eluded the academy for decades.

Most scholars now agree that once the political polarity is stripped away from the term “globalization,” what is revealed is a long-term process that preceded the cold war; transformed and was transformed by the cold war; and continued at accelerated speed after the cold war. For cold war scholars the challenge thus becomes to determine precisely how the cold war altered the course of political, economic, and cultural globalization, whether it halted or simply redirected the trajectory of increasing international connectivity and exchange, and how these long-term processes of globalization might have altered or possibly even contributed to the demise of the cold war.18

The same can be said for the environment, religion, and other “challenges to the cold war paradigm” that appear in this volume in juxtaposition with chapters on geopolitics, economics, and culture; the US-Soviet relationship and the cold war and the Middle East; the nuclear revolution and international institutions; and race and gender. The chapters do not speak with one voice, nor do they achieve a consensus let alone unanimity on the best and definite way to approach the history of the cold war. But that was never the objective behind bringing together this set of international scholars in a single collection. Rather, these chapters can and should be read as a conversation among experts in the field, each with a unique set of skills and perspective, in which the reader can play an active and independent part. Offering new, stimulating, and provocative avenues for future research, the essays represent the state of the field in historical scholarship on the cold war, bringing new insights to familiar topics and breaking ground on new ones. The cold war ended more than two decades ago; it will take decades more to take the full measure of it. While that process began almost as soon as the cold war originated, and it has benefited over the years from contributions from the likes of Herbert Feis and D.F. Fleming, Walter LaFeber and John Lewis Gaddis, Melvin Leffler and Michael Hogan, Odd Arne Westad and Robert J. McMahon, and so many, many more distinguished scholars, it has a long way to go. The intention of this volume is to both lay a foundation and serve as a catalyst for this continuing endeavor. It will be exciting.

Notes:

(1.) For the boundaries and debates, see Matthew Connelly, Robert J. McMahon, Katherine A.S. Sibley, Thomas Borstelmann, Nathan Citino, and Kristin Hoganson, “SHAFR and the World,” Passport (September 2011), 4–16.

(2.) Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Dudziak, Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: Race Relations and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: the United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1945–1955 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Penny Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Kevin Gaines, African Americans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

(3.) Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 216–26; Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (eds.), 1968: The World Transformed (Washington, DC: The German Historical Institute, 1998).

(4.) Christof Mauch, Nathan Stoltzfus, and Douglas R. Weiner (eds.), Shades of Green: Environmental Activism around the Globe (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

(5.) The literature of the break-up of the Grand Alliance is far too extensive to cite. For a recent book that presents an original argument, see Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

(6.) See in particular the chapters in this volume on “Historicizing the Cold War” by Akira Iriye and on “Human Rights” by Barbara Keys and Roland Burke.

(7.) Preamble of the United Nations charter accessed at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.

(8.) Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006); Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Orgainzations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

(9.) See in particular William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

(10.) Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Marc Gallicchio, The Scramble for Asia: US Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007); Hal Brands, Latin America's Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2010); Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Docrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

(11.) Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

(12.) Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights; Moyn, The Last Utopia; Christopher J. Lee (ed.), Making the World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010); Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008).

(13.) Nigel Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations with Arab Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1997); Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser's Egypt, 1953–1957 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism.

(14.) Narodom Sihanouk, My War with the CIA: The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk (New York: Pantheon, 1973); Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence (London: Equinox Publishing, 2007).

(15.) Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

(16.) Suri, Power and Protest.

(17.) Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (eds.), The Human Rights Revolution: An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also the chapters in this volume on “Human Rights” by Barbara Keys and Roland Burke, and “Gender and Women's Rights in the Cold War” by Helen Laville.

(18.) See for example the recent prize-winning article, Andrew McKevitt, “‘You Are Not Alone’: Anime and the Globalizing of America,” Diplomatic History 34 (November 2010): 893–921. Interdisciplinary works on globalization include Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Appadurai, Globalization (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); George Ritzer (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Globalization (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).