- About the Authors
- Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology
- The Thing Called Emotion
- Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring that Pervade Everyday Life
- The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science
- Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
- Stoicism and Epicureanism
- Emotions in Medieval Thought
- A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain
- Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre
- Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from the History of Psychopathology
- Emotional Choice and Rational Choice
- Why Be Emotional?
- Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo‐Jamesian Accounts
- Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear
- The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life
- Saying It
- Epistemic Emotions
- Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions
- A Plea for Ambivalence
- Emotion, Self‐/Other‐Awareness, and Autism: A Developmental Perspective
- Emotions and Values
- An Ethics of Emotion?
- The Moral Emotions
- Learning Emotions and Ethics
- Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation
- Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect
- Expression in the Arts
- Affects in Appreciation
- Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?
- Emotions, Art, and Immorality
Abstract and Keywords
The relation between emotion and reason has been a major topic in Western philosophy since its inception. The topic of this article, the relation between emotion and rationality, is a more recent concern, reflecting the fact that the idea of rationality is itself a fairly new one. The article does not explore the distinction between reason and rationality, except to note that while the idea of reason has a normative purpose, that of rationality serves to explain behavior. Strictly speaking, the idea of rationality, too, is primarily normative. It tells an agent what he or she should do to realize his or her aims as well as possible.
Jon Elster holds the Chair of Rationalité et Sciences Sociales at the Collège de France. His main research interests are the theory of individual and collective decision‐making, the empirical study of distributive and retributive justice, and the history of social thought. His recent writings include Alexis de Tocqueville: The First Social Scientist (Cambridge University Press 2009), Le désintéressement (Seuil 2009), Agir contre soi (Odile Jacob 2006), Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2004), and Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge University Press 1999).
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