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date: 19 April 2019

Abstract and Keywords

The chapter explicates the central resources that classical Husserlian phenomenology and its contemporary elaborations offer for the study of psychic disorders. We shall first discuss the phenomenological principles that enable analysis of the conditions and limits of experiencing and sense-constitution. We shall then clarify the concepts that phenomenologists have developed for the discussion of the normality and abnormality of experiencing—optimality and concordance—while also paying heed to the types of phenomena that classical and contemporary phenomenologists have tackled while developing their methods. In this vein, we will emphasize methodological factors that separate phenomenological studies of intentional experiencing from empirical studies of human behavior and psyche, on the one hand, and from alternative philosophical studies of the mind and consciousness, on the other hand. In sum, our chapter shows that phenomenology offers powerful tools for the systematic investigation of several different types of experiential disorders (such as depression and psychosis).

Keywords: normality, optimacy, concordance, experience, perception, sense-constitution, intentionality, disorder, Husserl

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