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date: 16 February 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter discusses how the methodological self-understanding outlined in Husserl’s early writings changes in later stages of the Phenomenological Movement. The discussion is guided by Merleau-Ponty’s short remarks in the preface of his Phenomenology of Perception about the ambiguity of the phenomenological method. Against this background, it is shown that the critical examination of the possibility of phenomenological reflection and the explanation of the idea of intentionality lead to relevant modifications and revisions of the initial assumptions concerning the phenomenological method. Particularly, the phenomenological concepts of the a priori, transcendental subjectivity, constitution, and descriptive analysis should be modified by considering the relevance of opposing aspects binding the phenomenological reflection also to facticity, the natural attitude, our life-world, and constructive moments. In addition, it is argued that the phenomenological task of offering an investigation of originary experience as a pre-linguistic and subjective experience should also be revised.

Keywords: intentionality, the a priori, transcendental subjectivity, life-world, constitution, description, construction, reflection

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