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date: 20 March 2019

Abstract and Keywords

In order to provide a balanced original exposition of the early period of Husserl’s philosophy, first his biography is surveyed, including the historiographical trends that influenced the scholarly views of the origins of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. Husserl’s development prior to the Logical Investigations is reconstructed by virtue of both his published juvenilia and the transformations of his underlying project of explaining (mathematical) inauthenticity. Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough in the Logical Investigations is presented in a historical-genetic way, considering its influence on the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists and the idealism–realism debate. Besides relying on a wide and modern textual basis, special attention is paid to the obvious or inconspicuous elements that connect the beginnings of Husserl’s philosophy to his mature transcendental phenomenology, as well as to those roots of his philosophy that extend beyond the confines of the School of Brentano.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Franz Brentano, psychologism, intentionality, theory of judgments, metaphysical neutralism

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