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date: 17 January 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter considers various ways of theorizing about lying from the point of view of Gricean Quality maxims. It first discusses attempts to characterize lying as a violation of the First Maxim of Quality and then turns to views of lying in terms of the supermaxim of Quality. The chapter suggests that both these types of view on lying give the wrong results on non-deceptive lies, the difference between lies and ironic statements, and the difference between lying and misleading. The chapter finishes by considering the view that lies are insincere assertion in relation to the Gricean view that Quality maxims have a special status in relation to the other maxims and the Cooperative Principle.

Keywords: lying, Gricean maxims, non-deceptive lies, irony, conversational implicatures, assertion, cooperation

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