Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 22 January 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter argues that Newman draws upon the British Naturalist tradition in fresh ways, especially in his effort to take up the challenge of epistemological scepticism. It examines the scholarly literature that has drawn attention to how John Locke and David Hume feature as formative influences on Newman’s philosophical thought while providing a closer look at how Newman engages with and appropriates insights from the Naturalist tradition in his own context. This chapter also furnishes two examples (the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties and conscience as a natural element of our mind) to illustrate the extent to which Newman is working within the Naturalist tradition. It concludes with two areas that deserve further reflection and development, namely, a more constructive understanding of the relationship between Newman’s naturalized epistemology and natural theology and a deeper analysis of how Newman appropriates and transforms the British Naturalist tradition.

Keywords: Locke, Hume, British Naturalist tradition, conscience, trustworthiness of faculties, epistemology, proper function, receptions of Newman, Naturalism, scepticism

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.