- Consulting Editors
- Economic Perspectives on Peaceand Conflict
- Informational Aspects of Conflict
- Commitment Problems and Shifting Poweras a Cause of Conflict
- Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information
- The Hobbesian Trap
- Religion, Conflict, and Cooperation
- Comparing Polarization Measures
- Inequality, Polarization, and Conflict
- On the Causes of Civil War
- Reflections on Africa’s Wars
- Methods For Measuring Aggregate Costs Of Conflict
- How Many Bucks in a Bang: On the Estimation of the Economic Costs of Conflict
- Estimating the Costs of War: Methodological Issues, with Applications to Iraq and Afghanistan
- Estimating the Human Costs of War: The Sample Survey Approach
- Mental Health In The Aftermath Of Conflict
- Measuring the Economic Costs of Terrorism
- Assessing the Effects of Military Expenditures on Growth
- The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment
- Technologies of Conflict
- Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts
- Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
- Laboratory Experiments on Conflict
- War, Trade, and Natural Resources: A Historical Perspective
- Trade in the Shadow of Power
- Conflict and Policy in General Equilibrium: Insights from a Standard Trade Model
- The Use of Coercion in Society: Insecure Property Rights, Conflict, and Economic Backwardness
- War and Poverty
- Aggressive Elites and Vulnerable Entrepreneurs: Trust and Cooperation in the Shadow of Conflict
- Globalization and International Conflict: Can Foreign Direct Investment Increase Cooperation Among Nations?
- National Borders, Conflict and Peace
- Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited
- Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment, and Conflict
- Conflict-Inhibiting Norms
Abstract and Keywords
This article explores the classic problem of “multiple battlefields,” where adversaries allocate resources across different contests, and examines conflicts comprised of component conflicts that are winner-takes-all contests. One of the first games ever formulated, the Colonel Blotto game by Borel in 1921, is an example of such a multi-item contest. Conflicts involving multiple component contests with structural linkages play a prominent role in the history of game theory. In addition to breaking down the analysis according to the nature of the linkages across contests, the article also divides the analysis according to the type of contest success function employed in each battlefield contest.
Dan Kovenock is the J. Edward Lundy Professor of Economics and a professor of political science at the University of Iowa and the Rebecca and William Dunn Distinguished Professor at Chapman University.
Brian Roberson is an assistant professor of economics at Purdue University.
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