Abstract and Keywords
Discourse comprehension is viewed from a multilevel framework that includes the levels of words, syntax, textbase, situation model, rhetorical structure, genre, and pragmatic communication. Discourse researchers investigate the cognitive representation of these levels and the process of constructing them during comprehension. Comprehension frequently is successful at all levels, but sometimes there are communication misalignments, information gaps, ungrounded symbols, and other comprehension obstacles that increase processing time or that lead to comprehension breakdowns. Psychologists have developed a number of psychological models of discourse comprehension, such as the the construction-integration, constructionist, and indexical-embodiment models. Advances in corpus and computational linguistics have allowed interdisciplinary researchers to systematically analyze the words, syntax, semantics, cohesion, situation model, world knowledge, and global structure of texts with computers. These computer analyses help researchers discover new discourse patterns, test hypotheses more rigorously, assess potential confounding variables, and scale texts on difficulty.
Our definition of discourse includes both oral conversation and printed text. The spoken utterances in oral conversation and the sentences in printed text are composed by the speaker/writer with the intention of communicating interesting and informative messages to the listener/reader. Therefore, naturalistic discourse is likely to be coherent, understandable to the community of discourse participants, and relevant to the situational goals. Sometimes discourse communication breaks down, however. Communication breakdowns occur when the writer and reader (or speaker and listener) are faced with substantial gulfs in language, prior knowledge, or discourse skills. Minor misalignments often grab the comprehender’s attention, as in the case of a mispronounced word, a rare word in a text, an ungrammatical sentence, or a sentence that does not fit into the discourse flow. A model of discourse comprehension should handle instances when there are communication breakdowns in addition to successful comprehension.
Psychological theories of comprehension have identified the representations, structures, strategies, and processes at multiple levels of discourse (Clark, 1996; Graesser & McNamara, 2011; Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997; Kintsch, 1998; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Snow, 2002; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The taxonomy we adopt in this chapter is an expanded version of one presented by Graesser et al. (1997): words, syntax, the explicit textbase, the referential situation model (sometimes called the mental model), the discourse genre and rhetorical structure (the type of discourse and its composition), and the pragmatic communication level (between speaker and listener, or writer and reader). Words and syntax are self-explanatory and form what is sometimes called the surface code. The textbase contains explicit (p. 476) propositions in the text in a form that preserves the meaning but not the surface code of wording and syntax. The situation model is the referential content or microworld that the text is describing. This would include the people, objects, spatial setting, actions, events, processes, plans, thoughts and emotions of people, and other referential content. The text genre is the type of discourse, such as a news story, a folk tale, a persuasive editorial, or a science text that explains a causal mechanism. The argument can be made that there is a psychological foundation for differentiating these six levels, as will be clarified throughout this chapter. However, it would be a mistake to view them as crisp separable levels because there are systematic links between levels and occasionally it is debatable on where information components reside.
Table 30.1 elaborates on these six levels by identifying the codes, constituents, and content associated with each level. This chapter will not precisely define each level and the associated terminology, but the table does provide example components of each level. Table 30.1 depicts the levels of discourse as compositional components that are constructed as a result of comprehension. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that this compositional viewpoint is incomplete without considering the affiliated knowledge and process viewpoints. For any given compositional entity C, the person needs to have had the prerequisite knowledge about C through prior experiences and training. The person needs to be able to process C by identifying its occurrence in the discourse and by executing relevant cognitive processes, procedures, and strategies proficiently.
The remainder of this chapter has three sections. The first section discusses some of the mechanisms that operate when readers/listeners experience comprehension difficulties, breakdowns, or communication misalignments. Such comprehension challenges are informative because they predict measures of attention, reading time, memory, reasoning, behavior, and other manifestations of cognition. The second section reviews psychological models of discourse that attempt to explain comprehension processes and representations. The third section describes advances in corpus and computational linguistics that have computers automatically analyze texts on the various discourse levels: words, (p. 477) syntax, semantics, cohesion, situation models, global structure, and world knowledge. These three sections are written from the lens of the multilevel discourse comprehension framework.
Table 30.1 Levels of Language and Discourse
Example Components of Level
Lexical meaning representation
Word composition (graphemes, phonemes, syllables, morphemes, lemmas)
Parts of speech (noun, verb, adjective, adverb, determiner, connective)
Syntax (noun-phrase, verb-phrase, prepositional phrase, clause)
Explicit propositions or clauses
Referents linked to referring expressions
Bridging inferences that connect propositions, clauses, or words
Connectives that explicitly link clauses
4. Situation model
Situation conveyed in the text
Agents, objects, and abstract entities
Dimensions of temporality, spatiality, causality, intentionality
Inferences that elaborate text and link to the reader’s experiential knowledge
Given versus new information
Images and mental simulations of events
5. Genre and rhetorical structure
Discourse category (narrative, persuasive, expository, descriptive)
Rhetorical composition (cause + effect, claim + evidence, problem + solution)
Epistemological status of propositions and clauses (claim, evidence, warrant)
Speech act categories (assertion, question, command, request, greeting, etc.)
Theme, moral, or point of discourse
6. Pragmatic communication
Goals of author
Attitudes and beliefs (humor, sarcasm, eulogy, deprecation)
Obstacles of Multilevel Comprehension
Comprehenders can face obstacles at any of the levels in Table 30.1. There can be deficits in the comprehender (e.g., lack of knowledge or skill) or the discourse (e.g., incoherent text, unintelligible speech). The severity of a comprehension obstacle can range from a minor irregularity that adds some cost in processing time to a complete breakdown in comprehension. At one end of the continuum is a misspelled word that adds a small amount of processing time to fill in its meaning. At the other end of the continuum is a student who gives up trying to understand a complex text on electronics. Attempts can be made to compensate for a comprehension obstacle at one (or more) of the six levels by recruiting information from other levels of discourse, from prior knowledge, from external sources (e.g., other people or technologies), or from strategies. Sometimes deeper levels of comprehension can compensate for deficits at the shallower levels. However, such compensation will obviously not work if information at the shallow levels needs to be successfully registered. Compensatory processing will also not be successful when the deeper levels have errors, misconceptions, or irrelevant content. The scenarios that follow illustrate some discourse obstacles and the resulting consequences and compensations with respect to the other levels of the multilevel framework.
Scenario 1. A student in a foreign language course has mastered the phonemes but very little of the vocabulary. The vocabulary deficit prevents him from understanding any of the conversations in class. The breakdown at discourse level 1 also blocks the deeper levels of 2–6 (see Table 30.1).
Scenario 2. An employee reads a health insurance document that has lengthy sentences with embedded clauses and numerous quantifiers (all, many, rarely) and Boolean operators (and, or, not, if). She understands nearly all of the words but has only a vague idea what the document explicitly states because of complex syntax, a dense textbase, and an ungrounded situation model (i.e., deficits at levels 2–4). However, she signs the contract because she understands its purpose and trusts the Human Resources Department of the employer. Levels 5 and 6 circumvent the need to understand levels 2–4 completely.
Scenario 3. A couple read the directions to assemble a new computer. They argue about how to hook up the cables on the dual monitors. They have no problem understanding the words and textbase in the directions (levels 1–3) and no problem understanding the genre and purpose of the document (levels 5 and 6), but they do have a deficit at the situation model level (level 4).
Scenario 4. A science student asks his roommate to proofread a term paper, but the roommate is a journalism major who knows little about science and complains that there is a problem with logical flow. The science major revises the text by adding connectives (e.g., because, so, therefore, before) and other words to improve the cohesion. The revised composition is deemed more comprehensible. In this case, improvements at levels 1 and 3 compensated for a deficit at level 4.
Scenario 5. Parents take their children to a new Disney movie that they discover has a few adult themes. The children notice the parents laughing at different points in the movie than they do. The children are making it successfully through discourse levels 1–4, but levels 5 and 6 are not intact.
Scenario 6. A jury receives instructions on a case, their decision options, and the legal ground rules of justice. However, the jury has trouble understanding the jargon, abstractions, and dense legal language, so they instead appeal to their intuitions on common-sense justice. In this case, the schema for common-sense justice at level 4 interferes with comprehension at levels 1–3.
These scenarios illustrate how deficiencies at one or more discourse levels can have substantial repercussions on the processing at other levels. Discourse researchers need to understand the processing mechanisms both within levels and between levels.
Metacognition is the knowledge that a person has about cognitive mechanisms—thinking about thinking (Hacker, Dunlosky, & Graesser, 2009). Research on metacomprehension has revealed that people may have deficits at one or more comprehension levels without being aware of it. For example, in research on comprehension calibration (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007; Maki, 1998), ratings are collected from readers on how well they believe they have comprehended texts and these ratings are correlated with objective tests of text comprehension. The comprehension calibration correlations are alarmingly low (r = .27) even among college students. Readers often have an illusion of comprehension (p. 478) when they read text because they settle for shallow levels of analysis as a criterion for adequate comprehension (Baker, 1985; Daneman, Lennertz, & Hannon, 2006; Otero & Kintsch, 1992). Shallow readers believe they have adequately comprehended text if they can recognize the content words and can understand most of the sentences, when in fact they are missing the deeper knowledge and occasional contradictions or false claims. Deep comprehension requires inferences, linking ideas coherently, scrutinizing the validity of claims with a critical stance, and understanding the motives of authors (Kendeou & Van den Broek, 2007; Rapp, 2008; Rouet, 2006; Wiley et al., 2009). Deep comprehension may only be selectively achieved in everyday comprehension experiences. Many readers settle for shallow comprehension for discourse unless they have a high amount of background knowledge (O’Reilly & McNamara, 2007), the information is in the discourse focus (Sanford & Graesser, 2006; Sturt, Sanford, Steward, & Dawydiak, 2004; Ward & Sturt, 2007), the genre dictates careful scrutiny of information (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007), or the information is highly relevant to the readers’ goals (Kaakinen & Hyona, 2007; McCruddin & Schraw, 2007).
In studies conducted in our laboratory (Graesser et al., 2004; VanLehn et al., 2007), college students read textbooks on technical topics such as computer literacy and Newtonian physics. They subsequently completed a rigorous test on deep knowledge with multiple-choice questions similar to the Force Concept Inventory in physics (Hestenes, Wells, & Swackhamer, 1992). We were surprised to learn that the college students had zero learning gains from reading the textbook and that the posttest scores did not differ from a condition in which the students read nothing at all. In contrast, the learning gains were quite substantial when there was a learning environment that challenged their comprehension of the material and engaged in tutorial dialogue (through a computer system called AutoTutor). Results such as these strongly suggest that the reading strategies of literate adults are far from optimal when considering deep comprehension. Our college students did not achieve deep comprehension on texts about physics and computer literacy even when they had a nontrivial amount of world knowledge on these topics and sufficient reading strategies to land them in college.
Comprehension deficits also periodically occur in conversations. An important foundation for communication is forming a common ground (shared knowledge) among speech participants (Bard et al., 2007; Clark, 1996; Holler & Wilkin, 2009; Schober & Brennan, 2003). This requires making appropriate assumptions on what each other already knows (“old” or “given” knowledge in the common ground) and by performing acts of communication (verbal or nonverbal) about new information that is properly coordinated with what each other knows. People normally assume that knowledge is in the common ground if it (a) is physically co-present and salient (all parties in the communication can perceive it); (b) has been verbally expressed and understood in the discourse space, in front of the sender, recipients, and side audience; and/or (c) it is common knowledge for members of a group, culture, or target community. Communication breakdowns occur to the extent that one or more of these conditions are in jeopardy.
Regarding the coordination of acts of communication, there are discourse devices that facilitate successful communication. Clark (1996) has proposed four levels in the joint action ladder:
Level A: Attention. Is the intended recipient paying attention?
Level B: Listening. Is the recipient actively listening and identifying signals?
Level C: Understanding. Does the recipient understand the message of the sender?
Level D: Action. Does the recipient perform a verbal or physical action that reflects understanding?
Breakdowns occur when there is a misfire at any one of these levels. However, it can be difficult to know which level is problematic when there is no response from a recipient. Clark’s principle of upward causality predicts that disruption at lower levels propagates to higher levels. Indeed, failure at the attention Level A accounts for many of the disruptions that occur in communication technologies, such as e-mail and instant messaging (Hancock & Dunham, 2001). Simply put, it is not clear whether the recipient is paying attention. The sender can ask questions to inquire about the status of the listener with respect to these four levels: “Are you there?” “Are you listening?” “Do you understand?” “Could you recap/summarize?” These discourse acts correspond to a second track discussion (Track 2, metacommunication) that specifically addresses communication problems.
One important signal of a recipient is backchannel feedback. Backchannel feedback (“uh huh,” “okay,” head nod) from the recipient acknowledges (p. 479) the sender’s message (i.e., conversation tracks 1 and 2 are in check). In face-to-face conversations in English, backchannel feedback is typically provided by the recipient after every 10–15 syllables, on the average. The recipient who gives more backchannel feedback could possibly be viewed as annoying, whereas much less feedback makes the recipient appear distracted, skeptical, or unresponsive. In e-mail, backchannel feedback is an important courtesy after a sender’s message, but some recipients do not extend this courtesy. Sometimes it is appropriate to withhold backchannel feedback, as in the case of a large teleconference on a telephone system that imposes transmission latencies after every party turn; when this occurs, the organizer needs to declare rules such as “Whenever I say something and then pause, please respond only if you disagree or have something new to say.”
Degrees of comprehension are manifested in conversation patterns that span larger sequences of turns between conversational participants. The conversation patterns are quite different in different sociocultural settings. For example, consider different educational settings. In the context of classroom teaching, a common pattern is the IRE sequence (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975) in which the instructor asks a question (Initiate), the student answers (Response), and the instructor gives feedback on the answer (Evaluate). In tutorial dialogue, there is a five-step tutoring frame in which the tutor asks a difficult question, the student answers, the tutor gives short feedback (positive, negative, or neutral), there is an optional extended multiturn elaboration of the answer, the tutor asks a comprehension-gauging question (e.g., “Do you understand?”), and the student designates his or her level of understanding (Graesser, D’Mello, & Person, 2009). In dialogues between a leader and follower that require referential grounding, there often are four-step sequences: Leader: “You lift the red bar.” Follower: “The red bar?” Leader: “Yes, that red bar.” Follower: “Okay, the red bar” (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). This four-step frame can be more economically expressed in face-to-face interaction by pointing gestures, directing a person’s gaze, and other nonverbal channels (Bard et al., 2007; Hanna & Brennan, 2007; Holler & Wilkin, 2009; Van der Sluis & Krahmer, 2007).
Available psychological research supports a number of generalizations about the processing order, constraints, interaction, and compensatory mechanisms of the different levels of discourse comprehension. Some of these generalizations are briefly described next.
Bottom-Up Dependencies of Meaning
In a strictly bottom-up model of reading, the ordering on depth is assumed to be levels 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 6 (see Table 30.1). Most researchers endorse an interactive model of reading rather than a strictly bottom-up model (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1994; Rumelhart, 1977; Taraban & McClelland, 1988; van den Broek, Rapp, & Kendeou, 2005). However, they also assume asymmetry in the constraints, such that the lower levels constrain the higher levels more than vice versa. The reading of words is robustly influenced by the bottom-up constraints of the letters and syllables (Gough, 1972; Rayner, 1998; Rayner & Pollatsek, 1994). The quality of a person’s lexicon has a large impact on the proficiency and speed of interpreting sentences and generating inferences at levels 2 and higher (Perfetti, 2007; Stanovich, 1986). It is important for readers to establish an interpretation of the textbase before they can productively move on to the construction of the situation model and higher levels (O’Reilly & McNamara, 2007). A partial to full analysis of levels 1–4 is presumably needed to adequately construct the rhetorical structure.
There is some question about the extent to which top-down processes influence lower level processes. Top-down processing is known to influence the speed and construction of word meanings (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1994), but there is less certainty about top-down influences on the construction of the textbase and situation model. Bransford and Johnson (1972) conducted a series of studies with vague abstract texts that were very difficult to comprehend without the introduction of a title that identifies a higher order schema (such as washing clothes) that coherently organizes the text content. Zwaan (1994) reported that the encoding of the surface code, textbase, and situation model had different profiles when college students were told they were reading a newspaper article versus literature. As predicted, the literature instructions enhanced the surface code, whereas the newspaper instructions enhanced the situation model. These top-down influences of comprehending the textbase and situation model are provocative, but the effects are confined to texts that are extremely ambiguous or malleable in interpretation. The vast majority of texts are much more constrained.
Novel Information Requires More Processing Effort Than Familiar and Automatized Components
Novelty of information is a foundational cognitive dimension that attracts attention, effort, and (p. 480) processing resources, and that predicts salience in memory (Tulving & Kroll, 1995). In spoken conversation, there are prosodic features that signal the occurrence of given information versus new information in the discourse space (Clark, 1996; Nygaard, Herold, & Namy, 2009; Riesco-Bernier & Romero-Trillo, 2008). Reading studies with eye tracking or self-paced reading times show that more processing time is allocated to rare words than high-frequency words (Just & Carpenter, 1987; Pollatsek, Slattery, & Juhasz, 2008; Rayner, 1998) and to new information expressed in the textbase and situation model than to old information already mentioned (Haberlandt & Graesser, 1985; Kaakinen & Hyona, 2007). Graesser and McNamara (2011) proposed that the highest density of novel information resides in lower frequency words, the textbase level, and the situation model (levels 1, 3, and 4). In contrast, most aspects of syntax, genre, and author characteristics (levels 2, 5, and 6) are frequently experienced and therefore overlearned and automatized; these levels are quickly processed or are invisible to the comprehender unless there are obstacles.
Attention, Consciousness, and Effort Gravitate to Comprehension Obstacles
Obstacles at any level of analysis are likely to draw cognitive resources. Reading time studies have shown that extra processing time is allocated to pronouns that have unresolved or ambiguous referents (Gernsbacher, 1990; Rayner, 1998), to sentences that have breaks in textbase cohesion (Gernsbacher, 1990), to sentences that have coherence breaks in the situation model on the dimensions of temporality, spatiality, causality, and intentionality (Magliano & Radvansky, 2001; Zwaan, Magliano & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), and to sentences that contradict ideas already established in the evolving situation model (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007; O’Brien, Rizzella, Albrecht, & Halleran, 1998; Rapp, 2008). Attention drifts toward sources of cognitive disequilibrium, such as impasses, anomalies, discrepancies, and contradictions (Graesser, Lu, Olde, Cooper-Pye, & Whitten, 2005).
Comprehension Obstacles May Be Repaired or Circumvented by World Knowledge, Information at Other Discourse Levels, or External Sources
The scenarios described earlier illustrate some compensatory mechanisms that repair or circumvent the comprehension obstacles. For example, the syntax, textbase, and situation model deficits in scenario 2 are circumvented by the information in discourse levels 5 and 6; in this case the person has enough information about levels 5 and 6 to know that deep understanding of levels 2–4 is unnecessary. The gaps and misalignments in the situation model of scenario 3 are rectified by extended conversations between the couple and by active problem solving. Coherence gaps in the textbase and situation model of scenario 4 are rectified by augmenting the discourse at levels 1 and 2 with connectives and other cohesion markers. Inserting these connectives and markers is known to improve comprehension, particularly for readers with low subject matter knowledge or low reading comprehension skill (Britton & Gulgoz, 1991; McNamara & Kintsch, 1996; O’Reilly & McNamara, 2007).
The multilevel comprehension framework outlined in this section has provided a plausible sketch of the complexities of constructing meaning on different levels during discourse comprehension. There are multiple levels of meaning that mutually, but asymmetrically, constrain each other. The components at each level are successfully built if the text is naturalistic and the reader has prerequisite background knowledge and reading skills. However, there are periodic comprehension obstacles that range from minor misalignments and comprehension difficulties to complete communication breakdowns. The misfires are magnets of attention that sometimes trigger compensatory mechanisms that repair or circumvent the problems.
Psychological Models of Discourse Comprehension
Discourse psychologists have developed several theoretical models of comprehension during the last two decades. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to cover all of these models, but we will contrast three models that are representative of particular classes of models. A construction-integration model (Kintsch, 1998) will represent a class of bottom-up models, which would also include the memory-based resonance model developed by Myers and O’Brien (Myers, O’Brien, Albrecht, & Mason, 1994; O’Brien et al., 1998). A constructionist model by Graesser, Singer, and Trabasso (1994) will represent a class of strategy-driven models, which would also include the structure-building framework (Gernsbacher, 1990) and the event-indexing model (Zwaan et al., 2005; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). An indexical model by Glenberg (Glenberg & Robertson, 1999) will represent a class (p. 481) of embodied cognition models (Glenberg, 1997; de Vega, Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008). There are other models that that can be viewed as hybrids of these three classes, such as the landscape model (Van den Broek, Virtue, Everson, Tzeng, & Sung, 2002), the CAPS/Reader model (Just & Carpenter’s, 1992), and the 3CAPS model (Goldman, Varma, & Cote, 1996).
Kintsch’s (1998) construction-integration (CI) model is currently regarded as the most comprehensive psychological model of comprehension. The model accommodates a large body of psychological data, including reading times, activation of concepts at different phases of comprehension, sentence recognition, text recall, and text summarization. Comprehension strategies exist, but they do not drive the comprehension engine. Instead, comprehension lies in (a) the bottom-up activation of knowledge in long-term memory from textual input (the construction phase) and (b) the integration of activated ideas in working memory (the integration phase). As each sentence or clause in a text is comprehended, there is a construction phase followed by an integration phase.
The construction phase for each sentence activates hundreds of nodes, which correspond to concepts, propositions, rules, and other forms of content. The nodes cover the various levels of representation in the multilevel comprehension framework (see Table 30.1). The model assumes that a connectionist network (Mayberry, Crocker, & Knoeferle, 2009; Taraban & McClelland, 1988) is iteratively created, modified, and updated during the course of comprehension. That is, as text is read, sentence by sentence (or clause by clause), a set of word concept nodes and proposition nodes are activated (constructed). Some nodes correspond to explicit constituents in the text, whereas others are activated inferentially. The activation of each node in the network fluctuates systematically during the course of comprehension as each sentence is read. When a sentence (or clause) S is read, the set of N activated nodes include (a) the explicit and inference nodes affiliated with S and (b) the nodes that are held over in working memory from the previous sentence S-1 by virtue of meeting some threshold of activation. There are N nodes that have varying degrees of activation while comprehending sentence S. These N nodes are fully connected to each other in a weight space. The set of weights in the resulting N by N connectivity matrix specifies the extent to which each node activates or inhibits the activation of each of the N nodes. The values of the weights in the connectivity matrix are theoretically motivated by the multiple levels of language and discourse. For example, if two proposition nodes (A and B) are closely related semantically, they would have a high positive weight, whereas if the two propositions contradict each other, they would have a high negative weight.
The integration phase modifies activation of the N nodes dynamically. At construction, the N nodes are activated to varying degrees, specified by an initial activation vector (a1, a2,…aN). The connectivity matrix then operates on this initial node activation vector in multiple activation cycles until there is a settling of the node activations to a new final stable activation profile for the N nodes. At that point, integration of the nodes has been achieved. This is computed mathematically by the initial activation vector being multiplied by the same connectivity matrix in multiple iterations until the N output vectors of two successive interactions show extremely small differences (signifying a stable settling of the integration phase). Sentences that are more difficult to comprehend would presumably require more cycles to settle. The settling process history and/or final activation values of the N nodes are able to predict different types of experimental measures, such as reading times, word priming, recall, recognition, and summarization.
Comprehension is more directed and strategic according to the constructionist theory proposed by Graesser, Singer, and Trabasso (1994). The distinctive strategies of this model are reflected in its three principal assumptions: reader goals, coherence, and the explanation. The reader goal assumption states that readers attend to content in the text that is relevant to the goals of the reader (McCrudden & Schraw, 2007). For example, adults read newspaper articles for the purpose of being updated about events and factual information, whereas novels are read for the purpose of being entertained. Newspapers are rarely read front to back, whereas novels often are completed even though they are much longer. The coherence assumption states that readers attempt to construct meaning representations that are coherent at both local and global levels. Therefore, coherence gaps in the text will stimulate the reader to actively think, generate inferences, and reinterpret the text in an effort to fill in, repair, or take note of the coherence gap. The explanation assumption states that good comprehenders tend to generate explanations (p. 482) of why events and actions in the text occur, why states exist, and why the author bothers expressing particular ideas. Why-questions encourage analysis of causal mechanisms, justifications of claims, and other deeper levels of the situation model. There are other assumptions of the constructionist theory that are shared by many other models, assumptions that address memory stores, levels of representation, world knowledge, activation of nodes, automaticity, and so on, but its signature assumptions address reader goals, coherence, and explanation. As in the case of the construction-integration model, the constructionist theory has accounted for data involving reading times, word priming, inference generation, recall of text information, and summarization.
The notion that coherence and explanation strategies are the hallmarks of good comprehension places constraints on comprehension. These strategies determine the selection of content that gets encoded, the inferences that are generated, and the time spent processing text constituents. For example, proficient readers are driven by why-questions more than how, when, where, and what-if, unless there are special goals to track the latter information. The explanations of the motives of characters and of the causes of unexpected events in a story are much more important than the spatial position of the characters in a setting, what the character looks like, and the procedures and style of how characters’ actions are performed. Such details about space, perceptual attributes, and actions are important when they serve an explanatory function or they address specific reader goals. When readers are asked to monitor why-questions during comprehension, their processing and memory for the text is very similar to normal comprehension without such orienting questions; however, when asked to monitor how questions and what happens next questions, their processing and memory show signs of being disrupted (Magliano, Trabasso, & Graesser, 1999). The explanation assumption of the constructionist theory applies to expository text in addition to stories. Students comprehend expository text more deeply when they normally build or are experimentally prompted to generate self-explanations of the material (Chi, deLeeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; McNamara, 2004; Millis et al., 2004).
Indexical Hypothesis and Embodiment
Glenberg’s Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg & Robertson, 1999) adopts an embodied theory of language and discourse comprehension (Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2004; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005). The central theoretical claim is that meaning is grounded in how we use our bodies as we perceive and act in the world. For example, comprehension of a story is predicted to improve after children have been able to perceive and manipulate the characters and objects in a story scenario. When adults read a manual on assembling a piece of equipment, their comprehension is expected to improve to the extent that they can enact the procedures or at least form visual images of the objects and actions. Readers who have the metacognitive strategy of grounding the entities and events mentioned in the text are expected to show comprehension advantages over those who do not bother taking such extra cognitive steps. It should be noted that the constructionist model would not encourage these strategies unless they served the strategies of building explanations, coherent representations, and representations that address particular reader goals. Similarly, the construction-integration model would not directly predict the importance of embodied representations.
A recent edited volume published some debates on the conceptual differences and the empirical evidence for embodied versus symbolic theories of comprehension (de Vega et al., 2008). A strong sense of embodiment exists in a representation that incorporates the constraints of an organism’s body, its location in the world, its perspective in perceiving the world, and its perceptual-motor interactions with the world. A weak sense of embodiment exists when there are vestiges of perceptions, actions, and perspectives in the representation, but the components are less detailed or underspecified, yet to some extent systematic or recoverable. A representation is not embodied when the symbols have an arbitrary relationship with the various components of perceptual-motor interactions with the world. In contrast, a symbolic representation is a structured set of symbols, each of which stands for some aspect of a referential domain. What it stands for may or may not be embodied. An amodal symbolic representation is not grounded in any embodied representation. A modal symbolic representation is connected to perceptual-motor experience either indirectly through interpretive mechanisms or directly through sensory transduction and motoric actuators. Consequently, embodied and symbolic representations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
There is growing support for the embodied framework, even though it has enjoyed only a decade of empirical testing (de Vega et al., 2008; Masson, Bub, & Warren, 2008; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005). However, as would be expected, there are some fundamental challenges for the embodiment framework in explaining discourse comprehension. The first challenge is that it is difficult to explain how embodied representations can be constructed at a normal reading rate of 150–400 words per minute. It takes approximately 300–1000 milliseconds to construct a new referent in a discourse space (i.e., in the mind’s eye), several hundred milliseconds to move an entity from one location to another, a few hundred more milliseconds to have the mental camera zoom in on an entity within a crowded mental space, and so on (Kosslyn, 1980; Millis, King, & Kim, 2001). These considerations on timing and complexity raise some doubts that all referring expressions and clauses in the text have fully embodied representations during reading. It should be noted that this challenge about comprehension time also would apply to the constructionist theorists who claim that deep explanations are constructed during comprehension. It may be impossible to construct deep explanations at a reading rate of 150–400 words per minute, which would explain the results of the studies that were reported earlier that very little deep knowledge is acquired from reading textbooks.
The second challenge is that embodied representations appear to be constructed only under very restricted conditions. Graesser and Jackson (2008) have argued that the embodied framework is essentially correct under the following conditions: (1) when tasks and tests involve goals and representations that are directly aligned with action, (2) when the stimuli are simple (e.g., few actors and objects in the mind’s eye), (3) when there is an existing visual-spatial grounding (e.g., an established spatial layout), and (4) when there is sufficient time and cognitive resources to carry out these processing operations. It is plausible that the small amount of content in the discourse focus is an excellent candidate for being a recipient of such cognitive activities. In contrast, disembodied symbolic representations are more explanatory when the relevant task goals do not encourage embodied processing, when the stimulus is complex, when there is minimal visual-spatial grounding, and when the reading rate is at the fast end of 150–400 words per minute. Much of the content that is presupposed and highly embedded will not be a good candidate for becoming a fully fleshed out embodied representation.
The aforementioned analysis addresses the relatively time-consuming integration phase of Kintsch’s construction integration model (Kintsch, 1998) rather than the initial activation of representations. It is possible to have quick activations of many types of representations, both embodied and symbolic, during the initial activation of information associated with content words. Much of this automatic activation of representations end up dying away and never make it to the integration phase that establishes a more coherent representation of the meaning of the text.
Computer Tools for Analyzing Language and Discourse at Multiple Levels
This is a unique point in history because there is widespread access to hundreds of computer tools that analyze specific texts and large text corpora. This increase in automated text analyses can be attributed to landmark advances in computational linguistics (Jurafsky & Martin, 2008), discourse processes (Graesser, Gernsbacher, & Goldman, 2003), statistical representations of world knowledge (Landauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2007), and corpus analyses (Biber, Conrad, & Reppen, 1998). Thousands of texts can be quickly accessed and analyzed on thousands of measures in a short amount of time. Of course, many theoretical components of discourse cannot currently be automated. In such cases it is necessary to have human experts annotate the texts systematically. However, human annotation is an expensive and time-consuming alternative, so it is essential to offload much of the work to computers. Moreover, an objective analysis of discourse should not rely entirely on human intuitions for scoring and annotation.
This chapter will present recent work on automated text analysis through the lens of Coh-Metrix (Graesser & McNamara, 2011; Graesser, McNamara, Louwerse, & Cai, 2004; McNamara, Louwerse, & Graesser, in press; McNamara, Louwerse, McCarthy, & Graesser, 2010). Coh-Metrix is a computer facility that analyzes texts on most of the discourse levels in Table 30.1, namely levels 1 through 5. The original purpose of the Coh-Metrix project was to concentrate on the cohesion of the textbase and situation model because those levels needed a more precise specification. However, it quickly became apparent that there is a need to automatically measure language and discourse processing at all of the levels under the rubric of the multilevel comprehension framework. The theoretical vision behind Coh-Metrix was to use the tool to (a) assess the overall cohesion and language difficulty of discourse on multiple levels, (b) investigate the constraints of discourse within levels and between levels, and (c) (p. 484) test models of multilevel discourse comprehension. There were also some practical goals in our vision: (a) to enhance standard text difficulty measures by providing scores on various cohesion and language characteristics and (b) to determine the appropriateness of a text for a reader with a particular profile of cognitive characteristics.
Coh-Metrix is available in both a public version for free on the Web (http://cohmetrix.memphis.edu, version 2.0) and an internal version (versions 2.1 and 3.0). The public version has over 60 measures of language and discourse at levels 1–5 in Table 30.1, whereas the internal research version has nearly a thousand measures that are at various stages of testing. Coh-Metrix is used by simply entering a text, filling in identifier information about the text, and clicking on a button. After a few seconds, the system produces a long list of measures on the text. If the text is extremely lengthy, the text can be divided into textiles of 500–1000 words. There is a help system that defines the measures and that provides various forms of contextual support. Discussed next are measures associated with the various levels of the multilevel framework. Examples of these measures can be found in Table 30.2.
Coh-Metrix was designed to move beyond standard readability formulas that rely on word length and sentence length to difficulty. Widely adopted measures of text difficulty are the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (Klare, 1974–5), Degrees of Reading Power (DRP; Koslin, Zeno, & Koslin, 1987), and Lexile scores (Stenner, 1996). Formula 1 shows the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level metric. Words refers to mean number of words per sentence and syllables refers to mean number of syllables per word.
Grade Level = .39 * Words + 11.8 * Syllables – 15.59 (1)
The lengths of words and sentences no doubt have important repercussions on psychological processes, but we need Coh-Metrix to scale texts on more levels.
Many Coh-Metrix measures refer to characteristics of individual words. Much can be discovered from computer facilities that link words to psychological dimensions, as in the case of WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) and Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). Coh-Metrix measures words on dozens of characteristics that were extracted from established psycholinguistic and corpus analyses, including WordNet and many of the categories of LIWC. The MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) is a collection of human ratings of several thousands of words along several psychological dimensions: meaningfulness, concreteness, imagability, age of acquisition, and familiarity. Coh-Metrix computes scores for word frequency, ambiguity, abstractness, and parts of speech, as is documented in the Coh-Metrix help system. There is a relative frequency per 1000 words for each particular category of words.
Coh-Metrix analyzes sentence syntax with the assistance of a syntactic parser developed by Charniak (2000). The parser assigns part-of-speech categories to words and syntactic tree structures to sentences. There are two notable measures of syntactic complexity that are predicted to place a high load on working memory. First, the number of modifiers per noun phrase is an index of the complexity of referencing expressions. “The very large angry dog” is a noun phrase with four modifiers of the head noun “dog.” Second, the number of words before the main verb of the main clause is an index of syntactic complexity because it places a burden on the working memory of the comprehender (Graesser, Cai, Louwerse, & Daniel, 2006; Just & Carpenter, 1987, 1992). Sentences with preposed clauses and left-embedded syntax require comprehenders to keep many words in working memory before getting to the meaning of the main clause.
The textbase theoretically contains explicit propositions in the text, referential links between explicit propositions, and a small number of inferences that connect the explicit propositions (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The propositions are in a stripped-down form that removes surface code features captured by determiners, quantifiers, tense, aspect, and auxiliary verbs. Co-reference is an important linguistic method of connecting propositions, clauses, and sentences in the textbase (Britton & Gulgoz, 1991; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; McNamara & Kintsch, 1996; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Referential cohesion occurs when a noun, pronoun, or noun phrase refers to another constituent in the text. For example, in the sentence When the intestines absorb the nutrients, the absorption is facilitated by some forms of bacteria, the word absorption in the second clause refers to the event (or alternatively the verb absorb) in the first clause. There is a referential cohesion gap when the (p. 485) words in a sentence or clause do not connect to other sentences in the text.
Table 30.2 Example Coh-Metrix Measures and Indices (Over 700 Available)
Level or Class
Frequency, concreteness, imagery, age of acquisition, part of speech, content words, pronouns, negations, connectives (different categories), logical operators, polysemy, hypernym/hyponym (reflects abstractness); these counts per 1000 words.
Syntactic complexity (words per noun phrase, words before main verb of main clause).
Cohesion of adjacent sentences as measured by overlapping nouns, pronouns, meaning stems (lemma, morpheme). Proportion of content words that overlap. Cohesion of all pairs of sentences in a paragraph.
Situation model cohesion
Cohesion of adjacent sentences with respect to causality, intentionality, temporality, spatiality, and latent semantic analysis (LSA). Cohesion among all sentences in paragraph and between paragraphs via LSA. Given versus new content.
Genre and rhetoric
Type of genre (narrative, science, other). Topic sentencehood
Flesch-Kincaid grade level, type token ration, syllables per word, words per sentence, sentences and paragraphs per 1000 words.
Coh-Metrix tracks five major types of lexical co-reference: common noun overlap, pronoun overlap, argument overlap, stem overlap, and content word overlap. Common noun overlap is the proportion of all sentence pairs that share one or more common nouns, whereas pronoun overlap is the proportion of sentence pairs that share one or more pronoun. Argument overlap is the proportion of all sentence pairs that share common nouns or pronouns (e.g., table/table, he/he, or table/tables). Stem overlap is the proportion of sentence pairs in which a noun (or pronoun) in one sentence has the same semantic morpheme (called a lemma) in common with any word in any grammatical category in the other sentence (e.g., the noun photograph and the verb photographed). The fifth co-reference index, content word overlap, is the proportion of content words that are the same between pairs of sentences. There are different variants of the five measures of co-reference. Some indices consider only pairs of adjacent sentences, whereas others consider all possible pairs of sentences in a paragraph.
Coh-Metrix treats pronouns carefully because pronouns are known to create problems in comprehension when readers have trouble linking the pronouns to referents. Coh-Metrix computes the incidence scores for personal pronouns (I, you, we) and the proportion of noun phrases that are filled with any pronoun (including it, these, that). Anaphors are pronouns that refer to previous nouns and constituents in the text. There are measures of anaphor overlap in Coh-Metrix that approximate binding the correct referent to a pronoun, but the pronoun resolution mechanism is not perfect. A pronoun is scored as having been filled with a referent corresponding to a previous constituent if there is any prior noun that agrees with the pronoun in number and gender and that satisfies some syntactic constraints (Lappin & Leass, 1994).
Connectives and discourse markers have the special function of linking clauses and sentences in the textbase (Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Louwerse, 2001; Sanders & Noordman, 2000). The categories of connectives in Coh-Metrix include additive (also, moreover), temporal (and then, after, during), causal (because, so), and logical operators (therefore, if, and, or). A higher relative frequency of these connectives increases cohesion in the textbase and also the situation model.
(p. 486) Situation Model
Text comprehension researchers have investigated five dimensions of the situational model (Zwaan et al., 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998): causation, intentionality, time, space, and protagonists. A break in cohesion or coherence occurs when there is a discontinuity on one or more of these situation model dimensions. Such discontinuities are known to increase reading times and trigger the generation of elaborative inferences (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Whenever such discontinuities occur, it is important to have connectives, transitional phrases, adverbs, or other signaling devices that convey to the readers that there is a discontinuity; we refer to these different forms of signaling as particles. Cohesion is facilitated by particles that clarify and stitch together the actions, goals, events, and states in the text.
Coh-Metrix analyzes the situation model dimension on causation, intentionality, space, and time, but not protagonists. For causal and intentional cohesion, Coh-Metrix computes the ratio of cohesion particles to the incidence of relevant referential content (i.e., main verbs that signal state changes, events, actions, and processes, as opposed to states). The ratio metric is essentially a conditionalized relative frequency of cohesion particles: Given the occurrence of relevant content (such as clauses with events or actions, but not states), Coh-Metrix computes the density of particles that stitch together the clauses. For example, the referential content for intentional information includes intentional actions performed by agents (kill, help, give, as in stories, scripts, and common procedures); in contrast, the intentional cohesion particles include infinitives and intentional connectives (in order to, so that, by means of).
Measuring temporal cohesion is important because of its ubiquitous presence in organizing language and discourse. Time is represented through inflected tense morphemes (e.g., -ed, is, has) in sentences of the English language. The temporal dimension also depicts unique internal event timeframes, such as an event that is complete (i.e., telic) or ongoing (i.e., atelic), by incorporating a diverse tense-aspect system. The occurrence of events at a point in time can be established by a large repertoire of adverbial cues, such as before, after, then. The temporal measures of Coh-Metrix compute a repetition score that tracks the consistency of tense (e.g., past and present) and aspect (perfective and progressive) across a passage of text. The repetition scores decrease as shifts in tense and aspect are encountered. A low score indicates that the representation of time in the text is disjointed, thus having a possible negative influence on the construction of a mental representation. When such temporal shifts occur, the readers would encounter difficulties without explicit particles that signal such shifts in time, such as the temporal adverbial (later on), temporal connective (before), or prepositional phrases with temporal nouns (on the previous day). A low particle-to-shift ratio is a symptom of problematic temporal cohesion.
In addition to the co-reference variables discussed earlier, Coh-Metrix assesses conceptual overlap between sentences by a statistical model of word meaning: Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer et al., 2007). LSA is an important method of computing the conceptual similarity between words, sentences, paragraphs, or texts because it considers implicit knowledge. LSA is a mathematical, statistical technique for representing world knowledge, based on a large corpus of texts. The central intuition is that the meaning of a word is captured by the company of other words that surround it in naturalistic documents. Two words are similar in meaning to the extent that they share similar surrounding words. For example, the word glass will be highly associated with words of the same functional context, such as cup, liquid, and pour. LSA uses a statistical technique called singular value decomposition to condense a very large corpus of texts to 100–500 statistical dimensions (Landauer et al., 2007). The conceptual similarity between any two text excerpts (e.g., word, clause, sentence, text) is computed as the geometric cosine between the values and weighted dimensions of the two text excerpts. The value of the cosine typically varies from 0 to 1. LSA-based cohesion was measured in several ways in Coh-Metrix, such as LSA similarity between adjacent sentences, LSA similarity between all possible pairs of sentences in a paragraph, and LSA similarity between adjacent paragraphs. The statistical representation of words in LSA depends on the corpus of texts on which they are trained. Coh-Metrix has different corpus options, but the default is the TASA corpora of academic textbooks; this is a corpus of over 10 million words that cover a broad range of topics.
Coh-Metrix supplies a LSA-based measure of given versus new information in text. Each sentence has a measure of the amount of given (G) versus new (N) information and a proportion score is computed for newness [N/(N + G)]. A text with a low newness score is considered redundant.
(p. 487) Genre and Rhetorical Composition
Coh-Metrix distinguishes texts in three genres that are typical of high-school reading exercises: narrative, social studies, and science. The indices are derived from discriminant analyses conducted to identify the language and discourse features that diagnostically predict the genre to which a text belongs (McCarthy, Myers, Briner, Graesser, & McNamara, 2009). A reader’s comprehension of a text can be facilitated by correctly identifying the textual characteristics that signal its genre (Biber, 1988). Researchers in educational psychology have shown that training struggling readers to recognize genre and global text structures helps them improve comprehension (Meyer & Wijekumar, 2007; Williams, Stafford, Lower, Hall, & Pollini, 2009). As discussed earlier, students read texts very differently if they view it as a newspaper article versus literature (Zwaan, 1994).
Identification of topic sentences in paragraphs is also an important component of rhetorical composition, at least for informational texts. These sentences are claims or main points that are elaborated by other sentences in the paragraph. They ideally occur in the paragraph initial position, although that ideal does not hold up in naturalistic texts (Popken, 1991). Coh-Metrix provides a number of measures of topic sentencehood that are either intrinsic characteristics of sentences or relative measures that involve comparisons between sentences in a paragraph.
Psychological Tests of Coh-Metrix
Coh-Metrix has been used in dozens of projects that investigate characteristics of discourse, comprehension, memory, and learning (Crossley, Louwerse, McCarthy, & McNamara, 2007; Graesser, Jeon, Yang, & Cai, 2007; McNamara et al., in press). These studies have validated the Coh-Metrix measures by comparing the computer output to language and discourse annotations by experts, to texts scaled on cohesion, to psychological data (e.g., ratings, reading times, memory, test performance), and to samples of texts that serve as gold standards. Coh-Metrix has uncovered differences among a wide range of discourse categories at level 5, such as differences between (a) spoken and written samples of English; (b) physics content in textbooks, texts prepared by researchers, and conversational discourse in tutorial dialogue; (c) articles written by different authors; (d) sections in typical science texts, such as introductions, methods, results, and discussions; and (e) texts that were adopted (or authentic) versus adapted (or simplified) for second language learning.
Graesser and McNamara (2012) recently conducted a principal components analysis (PCA, a type of factor analysis) on a large corpus of texts to investigate what dimensions of language and discourse account for variations among texts. The analysis was performed on 37,520 texts in a corpus provided by TASA (Touchstone Applied Science Associates). This corpus represents the texts that a typical senior in high school would have encountered between kindergarten and 12th grade. The texts were scaled on Degrees of Reading Power, which can approximately be translated into grade level (McNamara et al., in press). The genres of texts were also classified by TASA researchers, with most being in language arts (narrative), science, and social studies/history, but others in various categories of informational texts (business, health, home economics, and industrial arts). Nearly 100 measures of Coh-Metrix were explored in various PCAs, but the final analysis had 53 measures.
The PCA uncovered eight dimensions that accounted for an impressive 67% of the variability among texts. The major five dimensions were as follows:
1. Narrativity. Narrative text tells a story, with characters, events, places, and things that are familiar to the reader. Narrative is closely affiliated with everyday oral conversation.
2. Referential cohesion (textbase). High cohesion texts contain explicit words and ideas that overlap across sentences and the text.
3. Situation model cohesion. Causal, intentional, and temporal connectives help the reader to form a more coherent and deeper understanding of the text.
4. Syntactic simplicity. Sentences with few words and simple, familiar syntactic structures are easier to understand. Complex sentences have structurally embedded syntax.
5. Word concreteness. Concrete words evoke mental images and are more meaningful to the reader than abstract words.
It is quite apparent that these dimensions are closely aligned with the first five levels of the multilevel framework summarized in Table 30.1.
The five dimensions also predict measures that reflect psychological mechanisms (Graesser & McNamara, 2012). Standardized z-scores were computed for the five dimensions on the 37,520 TASA texts and were correlated with DRP grade-level (p. 488) scores. The correlations were substantial and predictable for narrativity (–.69), syntactic simplicity (–.47), and word concreteness (–.23), but lower for referential cohesion (.03) and situation model cohesion (.11). Moreover, McNamara, Louwerse, McCarthy, and Graesser (2010) reported that Coh-Metrix scores on referential and situational cohesion significantly predicted comprehension measures and recall measures in 19 studies (conducted by other researchers) that experimentally manipulated cohesion. These studies support the claim that the five dimensions of Coh-Metrix have some modicum of psychological reality. The Coh-Metrix tool should help advance theory and empirical research in discourse comprehension on a number of fronts. First, researchers can scale their texts on multiple levels of comprehension in order to perform manipulation checks, assess the impact of potential extraneous variables, and explore how the different levels of meaning are interrelated. Discourse researchers are routinely haunted that some extraneous variable may be responsible for their claims about the impact of text on psychological processes; Coh-Metrix can be used to measure and assess the potential extraneous variables. Second, researchers can test theoretical claims that texts have particular properties by collecting Coh-Metrix measures on a large corpus of naturalistic texts that are selected with rigorous scientific sampling procedures. This is a landmark advance over research 20 years ago when researchers cherry picked a handful of texts to suit their purposes. Third, researchers can discover new discourse patterns by applying data-mining procedures to the hundreds of Coh-Metrix dimensions when applied to thousands of texts. We anticipate many new research breakthroughs on multilevel discourse comprehension with computation tools such as Coh-Metrix, particularly if it is used in interdisciplinary efforts with researchers in psychology, linguistics, education, language arts, communication, computer science, and many other areas of the cognitive sciences.
This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (ALT-0834847, DRK12 0918409, BCS 0904909), the Institute of Education Sciences (R305G020018, R305H050169, R305B070349, R305A080589, R305A080594), and the US Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (H9C104–07–0014). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation, the Institute of Education Sciences, or the Department of Defense. Our gratitude goes to Zhiqiang Cai for his software development of Coh-Metrix, and to Nia Dowell, Jonna Kulikowich, Max Louwerse, Phil McCarthy, Danielle McNamara, and Jeremiah Sullins for their testing of Coh-Metrix on text samples.
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