Abstract and Keywords
This article begins with some arguments internal to Christian theism that constitute a cumulative case for theological voluntarism. It presents the principles of a divine command theory of obligation and sets forth what the most powerful objection to this theory. It then adds to the divine command theory of obligation a theistic account of ethical goodness according to which it depends on God but not on God's commands or will. Furthermore, it defends the divine command theory of obligation against two objections that it is easier to dispose of than the Euthyphro Objection but worth considering nevertheless because many people find them troublesome. It contains defense of the theory against the Euthyphro Objection and against one further objection to which that defense gives rise.
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