- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics
- Introduction: The New Philosophy of Economics
- Laws, Causation, and Economic Methodology
- If Economics Is a Science, What Kind of a Science Is It?
- Realistic Realism about Unrealistic Models
- Why There Is (as Yet) No Such Thing as an Economics of Knowledge
- Rationality and Indeterminacy
- Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences
- Competing Conceptions of the Individual in Recent Economics
- Integrating the Dynamics of Multiscale Economic Agency
- Methodological Issues in Experimental Design and Interpretation
- Progress in Economics: Lessons from the Spectrum Auctions
- Advancing Evolutionary Explanations in Economics: The Limited Usefulness of Tinbergen's Four‐Question Classification
- Computational Economics
- Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics
- Causality, Invariance, and Policy
- The Miracle of the Septuagint and the Promise of Data Mining in Economics
- Explaining Growth
- Segmented Labor Market Models in Developing Countries
- What Is Welfare and How Can We Measure It?
- Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
- Subjective Measures of Well‐Being: Philosophical Perspectives
- Facts and Values in Modern Economics
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article focuses on the relations between the work of its author on methodology, developments in philosophy of science, and the contributions of other methodologists. It explains how its work derives from philosophy of science, as the subject was understood in the 1970s. It is autobiographical, as its story may help readers to understand the outpouring of writing on economic methodology beginning in the 1970s. It sketches a view of philosophical methodology that articulates the roles that reflection, analysis and study of economics ought to play. It summarizes the views on economic methodology that are developed in the principal contributions of its author. It also relates that work to the contributions of other writers on economic methodology, particularly Uskali Mäki and Alexander Rosenberg.
Daniel M. Hausman is the Herbert A. Simon and Hilldale Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His research has centered on epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical issues lying at the boundaries between economics and philosophy. His books include The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics (Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006, with Michael McPherson). His most recent book, Preferences, Value, and Choice, and Welfare, is due out shortly from Cambridge University Press.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.