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date: 21 February 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article focuses on the cogito propositions and those propositions whose classification as a priori is disputed. It explains that a priori justification is commonly taken to be a kind of justification is based on reason rather than on experience and evaluates the skeptical view that no genuinely substantive proposition is a priori and that reason has far less power to reveal truth than has been supposed by a great many philosophers. It also discusses the domain of the a priori, empiricist skepticism about the a priori, and the case for a priori existential knowledge.

Keywords: cogito propositions, a priori justification, experience, reason, truth, empiricist skepticism, existential knowledge

Robert Audi

Robert Audi is Professor of Philosophy and David E. Gallo Chair in Ethics at the University of Notre Dame. He works in ethics and in related philosophical fields, especially epistemology. His books include Action, Intention, and Reason (1993), The Structure of Justification (1993), Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (1997), Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (2000), The Architecture of Reason (2001), The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (2004), and Moral Value and Human Diversity (2007).

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