- The Pyrrhonian Problematic
- The Problem of the Criterion
- Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents
- Hume's Skepticism
- Skepticism about the External World
- Skepticism about Induction
- Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions
- Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism
- Religious Skepticism
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses
- Berkeley's Treatment of Skepticism
- Kant's Response to Skepticism
- Reid's Response to the Skeptic
- Peirce and Skepticism
- Moore and Skepticism
- Austin's Way with Skepticism
- Wittgenstein on Certainty
- The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism
- Ascriber Contextualism
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology
- Closure and Alternative Possibilities
- Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma
- Externalist Responses to Skepticism
- Internalist Responses to Skepticism
- Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism
- Disjunctivism and Skepticism
Abstract and Keywords
This article focuses on the cogito propositions and those propositions whose classification as a priori is disputed. It explains that a priori justification is commonly taken to be a kind of justification is based on reason rather than on experience and evaluates the skeptical view that no genuinely substantive proposition is a priori and that reason has far less power to reveal truth than has been supposed by a great many philosophers. It also discusses the domain of the a priori, empiricist skepticism about the a priori, and the case for a priori existential knowledge.
Robert Audi is Professor of Philosophy and David E. Gallo Chair in Ethics at the University of Notre Dame. He works in ethics and in related philosophical fields, especially epistemology. His books include Action, Intention, and Reason (1993), The Structure of Justification (1993), Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (1997), Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (2000), The Architecture of Reason (2001), The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (2004), and Moral Value and Human Diversity (2007).
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