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date: 22 March 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines the problem of the criterion in relation the issue of skepticism. It explains that the problem of the criterion in epistemology raises certain fundamental questions concerning the methods a philosopher ought to use in arriving at both analyses of epistemic concepts and conclusions concerning legitimate principles of reasoning and justification. It explores the connections between metaepistemological views and the approach one would most naturally take to the problem of the criterion and suggests that the implication of the positions one takes on skepticism is a complicated issue.

Keywords: criterion, skepticism, epistemology, reasoning, justification, metaepistemological views

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