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date: 21 January 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines noncausal and event-causal theories of free agency. The first two sections address the question whether, if one or another of these accounts is true, that suffices for our having free will. The third section assesses the available evidence bearing on the truth of these views. It concludes that there is no good evidence that either a noncausal or an event-causal libertarian view is true.

Keywords: libertarianism, causation, human agency, free will

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