- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
- Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates
- Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will
- Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
- Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
- A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?
- Free Will Remains a Mystery
- Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues
- Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility
- Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism
- Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
- Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism
- Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
- Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples
- Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories
- Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency
- Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts
- Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth
- The Bounds of Freedom
- Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem
- Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism
- Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion
- Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism
- Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will
- Do We Have Free Will?
- Neurophilosophy of Free Will
Abstract and Keywords
This article examines noncausal and event-causal theories of free agency. The first two sections address the question whether, if one or another of these accounts is true, that suffices for our having free will. The third section assesses the available evidence bearing on the truth of these views. It concludes that there is no good evidence that either a noncausal or an event-causal libertarian view is true.
Randolph Clarke is professor of philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (2003) and a number of articles on agency, free will, and moral responsibility, including “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will” (1993), “Modest Libertarianism” (2000), and “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism” (2009).
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