- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
Abstract and Keywords
Transhumanist arguments in support of radical human enhancement are inimical to disability justice projects. Transhumanist thinkers, the strongest promoters of human enhancement, and fellow travelers who claim enhancement is a moral obligation, make arguments that rely on the denigration of disabled embodiment and lives. These arguments link disability with risk. The promotion of human enhancement is therefore open to significant disability critique despite transhumanism’s claims to allyship with disability justice activism. This chapter lays out such a disability critique of enhancement and further supports its claims by describing bioethics, and therefore transhumanism, as biopolitical in the sense Michel Foucault uses the term. Finally, this chapter develops an alternative vision of enhancement. This alternative vision poses a disability-inclusive future, accepts the risks of embodiment, and lays groundwork for a counterdiscourse of enhancement.
Melinda C. Hall (Ph.D., Vanderbilt University) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Stetson University. She specializes in bioethics, Continental philosophy, and the philosophy of disability. In The Bioethics of Enhancement: Transhumanism, Disability, and Biopolitics (Lexington Books, 2016), Hall draws from Michel Foucault to demonstrate that disability is central to debates over enhancement. Hall’s work also appears in Disability Studies Quarterly, International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, and Philosophy Compass, among other venues.
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