Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 18 February 2019

Abstract and Keywords

It has been argued that dignity is a useless concept that adds nothing to existing moral vocabulary: it is just a slogan. In this chapter, it is argued that only a concept of dignity can adequately explain a serious moral wrong inflicted on people with disabilities, namely their relegation to inferior social status. Far from being useless, it uniquely explains why fundamental changes to social relations are needed to secure justice. Moreover, dignity matters just as much for people with cognitive impairments as it does for everyone else. As such, fraught debates about the moral standing of people with severe cognitive impairment are largely irrelevant to explaining why they, too, should be treated as social equals.

Keywords: dignity, disability, harm, social status, moral standing

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.