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date: 10 December 2018

Abstract and Keywords

Dewey’s early organicist idealism related individual selves to God as functional parts of the absolute whole. His critiques of idealists T. H. Green and Josiah Royce exemplify his concern that no dualistic gap separates the knower from the object of knowledge. After he replaced the perfect absolute with the dynamic activity of life, two principles became paramount for Dewey’s mature philosophy. Metaphysically, all of human experience is within the same reality as everything else that is also real: nothing about experience segregates it apart from the rest of what is real. Epistemologically, an account of experience’s continuity with the rest of reality is compatible with understanding that continuity: nothing about experience prevents our knowing how experiences are within reality. Experience is ontologically continuous with nature, and inquiry creates the natural objects of knowledge. A Common Faith exemplifies this metaphysics as it explains the ethical growth of communities through religious experience.

Keywords: idealism, religion, religious experience, organicism, naturalism, metaphysics, Josiah Royce, T. H. Green

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