- Copyright Page
- How Should Votes Be Cast and Counted?
- Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?
- Divided Government: The King and the Council
- Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
- Politics and the Legal System
- Constitutional Review
- Institutions for Amending Constitutions
- Constitutional Transition
- Electoral Systems in the Making
- Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
- Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
- Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model After 40 Years
- Are There Types of Dictatorship?
- Are There Really Dictatorships?: The Selectorate and Authoritarian Governance
- The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes
- The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
- Direct Democracy and Public Policy
- Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
- The Significance of Political Parties
- The Least Dangerous Branch?: Public Choice, Constitutional Courts, and Democratic Governance
- Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
- The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
- The Politics of Central Bank Independence
- The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
- Political Participation and the Welfare State
- Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
- Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
- Is Government Growth Inevitable?
- The Political Economy of International Organizations
- The Politics of International Trade
- Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets, and the Shadow Economy: What Do We (Not) Know?
- The Politics of International Aid
- Is Democracy Exportable?
- Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
- Christian History and Public Choice
- Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
- Precursors to Public Choice
- Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
- The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
- Voting and Popularity
- Detection of Election Fraud
- Experimental Public Choice: Elections
- Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Abstract and Keywords
Federalism is a governance structure that enables the aggregation of mass areas under one government. Federalism is a more complex form of governance than a unitary system. Under a federal structure of government, the activities are constitutionally divided (or shared) between constituent governments and a central government, implying a permanent coexistence and bargaining between participating governments and the center or among participating governments themselves. This chapter delineates the current state of knowledge regarding federalism and its twin concept of decentralization from the public-choice perspective. First, the chapter looks at federalism as an explanatory variable by examining how it shapes various outcomes ranging from economic growth to incidence of terrorism. Second, it deals with endogenous federalism and thus factors that explain how it emerges, survives, and changes. In the last part, the chapter summarizes several potential avenues for future research on federalism.
Keywords: federalism, decentralization, decentralization theorem, Leviathan, accountability, market-preserving federalism, soft-budget constraint, status quo bias, race to the bottom, endogenous federalism
Jarosław Kantorowicz is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at University of Leiden.
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