- Copyright Page
- How Should Votes Be Cast and Counted?
- Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?
- Divided Government: The King and the Council
- Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
- Politics and the Legal System
- Constitutional Review
- Institutions for Amending Constitutions
- Constitutional Transition
- Electoral Systems in the Making
- Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
- Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
- Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model After 40 Years
- Are There Types of Dictatorship?
- Are There Really Dictatorships?: The Selectorate and Authoritarian Governance
- The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes
- The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
- Direct Democracy and Public Policy
- Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
- The Significance of Political Parties
- The Least Dangerous Branch?: Public Choice, Constitutional Courts, and Democratic Governance
- Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
- The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
- The Politics of Central Bank Independence
- The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
- Political Participation and the Welfare State
- Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
- Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
- Is Government Growth Inevitable?
- The Political Economy of International Organizations
- The Politics of International Trade
- Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets, and the Shadow Economy: What Do We (Not) Know?
- The Politics of International Aid
- Is Democracy Exportable?
- Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
- Christian History and Public Choice
- Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
- Precursors to Public Choice
- Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
- The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
- Voting and Popularity
- Detection of Election Fraud
- Experimental Public Choice: Elections
- Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Abstract and Keywords
Empirical constitutional economics has made great progress since the beginning of the millennium. Numerous important insights into the effects of constitutions have been uncovered. Rather than just summarizing the state of the art, this chapter identifies some of the most important challenges and pressing questions to be addressed by constitutional economics scholars. It further discusses the possible role of different empirical methods in this field of research. In spite of the progress that has been achieved, much work is left to be done and some of the early empirical findings might easily be overturned based on new and more reliable empirical evidence.
Stefan Voigt is Director of the Institute of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg.
Jerg Gutmann is Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Institute of Law and Economics at the University of Hamburg.
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