- Copyright Page
- How Should Votes Be Cast and Counted?
- Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?
- Divided Government: The King and the Council
- Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
- Politics and the Legal System
- Constitutional Review
- Institutions for Amending Constitutions
- Constitutional Transition
- Electoral Systems in the Making
- Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
- Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
- Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model After 40 Years
- Are There Types of Dictatorship?
- Are There Really Dictatorships?: The Selectorate and Authoritarian Governance
- The Coup: Competition for Office in Authoritarian Regimes
- The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
- Direct Democracy and Public Policy
- Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
- The Significance of Political Parties
- The Least Dangerous Branch?: Public Choice, Constitutional Courts, and Democratic Governance
- Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
- The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
- The Politics of Central Bank Independence
- The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
- Political Participation and the Welfare State
- Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
- Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
- Is Government Growth Inevitable?
- The Political Economy of International Organizations
- The Politics of International Trade
- Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets, and the Shadow Economy: What Do We (Not) Know?
- The Politics of International Aid
- Is Democracy Exportable?
- Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
- Christian History and Public Choice
- Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
- Precursors to Public Choice
- Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
- The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
- Voting and Popularity
- Detection of Election Fraud
- Experimental Public Choice: Elections
- Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Abstract and Keywords
Coups, understood as attempts to overthrow the sitting executive government by a group inside the state apparatus that includes part of the military, shape competition for office in authoritarian regimes. They do that both directly through actual coups and indirectly through the threat of a coup, which forces incumbent autocrats to balance loyalty and repression to pre-empt being overthrown. The chapter presents a framework for the study of coups and uses it to examine how coups can help select autocrats and to some extent keep them accountable. It presents a number of stylized facts about coups and summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of coups in autocracies.
Toke Aidt is University Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Economics at the University of Cambridge.
Gabriel Leon is a Lecturer in Political Economy in the Department of Political Economy at King's College London.
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