- Copyright Page
- Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public Choice
- Choosing among Governments
- Public Choice: Early Contributions
- From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow’s Theorem
- Institution-Induced Stability
- Voting Power
- Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules
- Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory
- Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications
- Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions
- Spatial Social Choice
- Economic Voting
- Valence Politics
- The Study of Strategic Voting
- Turnout: Why Do Voters Vote?
- Expressive Voting
- Altruism and Political Participation
- Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout
- Information Cues and Rational Ignorance
- Campaign Finance
- Primaries, Conventions, and Other Methods for Nominating Candidates: How Do They Matter?
- Logrolling and Coalitions
- Collective Action
- Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits
- The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation
- The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction
- Empirical Evidence on Rent-Seeking Costs
- “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group
- Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture
- The Political Economy of Trust
- Contested Political Persuasion
- Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change
- Leadership as Persuasion
- Fairness Concepts
- Social Contract versus Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social Dilemmas
- Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action
- Public Choice and Happiness
- Kantianism and Political Institutions
- Public Choice and Libertarianism
- Public Choice and Social Democracy
- Supreme Values, Totalitarianism, and Terrorism
- Fair Division in Dispute Resolution
- Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter stresses the necessity of distinguishing between a strategic vote and a strategic voter. The sincere voter always casts a sincere vote, while the strategic voter casts a sincere or strategic vote depending on the context and the voting rule. This leads to two definitions of strategic voting: a broad one, where a strategic vote is one that is partly based on expectations about the outcome of the election, and a narrow one, where a strategic vote also entails not voting sincerely. The chapter then reviews three types of empirical research that differ with respect to the type of data used: the observation of electoral outcomes, survey data, and lab experiments. That literature has confirmed that indeed some voters cast a strategic vote, though many studies have found most votes to be sincere. That research has also shown that there is some degree of strategic voting under all kinds of voting rules; that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is as much strategic voting under proportional representation as under plurality rule; and that the propensity to vote strategically depends very much on the type of information that is available.
André Blais is a Full Professor and Holder of the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies at Université de Montréal.
Arianna Degan is Director at the Interuniversity Center on Risk, Economic Policy and Employment at Université du Québec à Montréal.
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