- Copyright Page
- Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public Choice
- Choosing among Governments
- Public Choice: Early Contributions
- From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow’s Theorem
- Institution-Induced Stability
- Voting Power
- Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules
- Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory
- Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications
- Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions
- Spatial Social Choice
- Economic Voting
- Valence Politics
- The Study of Strategic Voting
- Turnout: Why Do Voters Vote?
- Expressive Voting
- Altruism and Political Participation
- Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout
- Information Cues and Rational Ignorance
- Campaign Finance
- Primaries, Conventions, and Other Methods for Nominating Candidates: How Do They Matter?
- Logrolling and Coalitions
- Collective Action
- Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits
- The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation
- The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction
- Empirical Evidence on Rent-Seeking Costs
- “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group
- Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture
- The Political Economy of Trust
- Contested Political Persuasion
- Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change
- Leadership as Persuasion
- Fairness Concepts
- Social Contract versus Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social Dilemmas
- Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action
- Public Choice and Happiness
- Kantianism and Political Institutions
- Public Choice and Libertarianism
- Public Choice and Social Democracy
- Supreme Values, Totalitarianism, and Terrorism
- Fair Division in Dispute Resolution
- Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries
Abstract and Keywords
We examine the economics and elections connection, often referred to as economic voting, via a review of key studies by economists and political scientists, focusing on key generalizations applicable across democracies. Early work (1930s–1960s) was exploratory, seeking to establish whether economics mattered for elections, in the examination of individual country studies. In two strands of later work, one (1970–1990) developed “vote-popularity functions” over time; another (1980–2000) researched micro-level economic voting in national election surveys. Leading, global generalizations began to emerge in the contemporary period (2000s–2010s), such as the following: sociotropic retrospective economic evaluations dominate the economic vote choice, the economic vote itself can vary with clarity of policy responsibility, and the strong research results at the national level mirror results at the individual voter level. Currently, questions of the impact of economic crisis, and further dimensions of the economic vote, such as positional or patrimonial voting, are under serious consideration.
Michael S. Lewis-Beck is F. Wendell Miller Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa.
Mary Stegmaier is Assistant Professor in the Truman School of Public Affairs at the University of Missouri.
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