Abstract and Keywords
This chapter reviews work on portfolio-maximizing strategic voting in parliamentary systems. It first offers a typology of strategies, sorting them into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories. This helps organize the literature and identify gaps. It then considers the equilibrium levels of portfolio-maximizing voting. Taking a game-theoretic perspective (where most of the literature takes a decision-theoretic approach) helps clarify how much strategic voting should be expected and also the interconnections between different varieties of strategic behavior. Finally, the chapter reviews the empirical evidence on the incidence of portfolio-maximizing voting, concluding with some thoughts on fruitful ways forward for future research.
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