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Subject: Philosophy  Book Title: The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
Kane, Robert (Editor), University Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
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Print publication date: 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-517854-8
Published to Oxford Handbooks Online: September 2009
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001


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Abstract: Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates – Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will – Fatalism – Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will – Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will – A Master Argument for Incompatibilism? – Free Will Remains a Mystery – Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues – Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility – Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism – Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities – Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism – Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases – Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples – Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories – Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency – Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts – Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth – The Bounds of Freedom – Determinism as True, Both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Problem – Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism – Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion – Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism – Autonomy, Self-Control, and Weakness of Will – Do We Have Free Will? – Neurophilosophy of Free Will

Keywords: action, agent, argument, compatibilism, consciousness, consequence, determinism, dualism, event, explanation, free will, libertarianism, metaethics, model, neuroscience, Other, real, reason, responsibility, self-control, subject, theology, will, cause, subjectivism, weakness of will
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3. Fatalism
Bernstein, Mark
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7. Free Will Remains a Mystery
van Inwagen, Peter
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19. The Bounds of Freedom
Strawson, Galen
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25. Do We Have Free Will?
Libet, Benjamin
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Bibliography
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Index
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Robert Kane is University Distinguished Teaching Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Free Will and Values (1985), Through the Moral Maze (1994), The Significance of Free Will (1996), (which was awarded the 1996 Robert W. Hamilton Faculty Book Award) and other writings in the philosophy of mind and action, ethics, the theory of values and philosophy of religion. Department of Philosophy, Waggener Hall 316, The University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712. E-mail: rkane@uts.cc.utexas.edu




 
Robert Kane
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001



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I Theology and Fatalism
II Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism
III The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism
IV Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility
V Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style Examples
VI Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will
VII Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and others
VIII Neuroscience and Free Will