This chapter investigates how conceptual representations of sources of knowledge make contact with linguistic evidentiality. By drawing on empirical evidence from both adult and child speakers of languages with different evidential systems, the present chapter aims to understand which aspects of cognition are shared by speakers of different languages and which aspects may be susceptible to linguistic influences. Findings from these lines of work support a universalist view of the relation between language and cognition, according to which linguistic categories of evidentiality do not shape, but build on conceptual representations of sources of knowledge that are shared across speakers of different languages.
Alexa Decker, Amanda Disney, Brianna D'elia, and Julian P. Keenan
Deception is a common behavioral phenotype across species. Homo sapiens deceive at an excessive rate and in a manner that is truly unique. While the neural correlates for deception are fairly well known, larger questions remain, such as when did these neural networks emerge, and did deception have anything to do with the emergence of these specific neural substrates? Furthermore, little is known about the neural substrates of self-deception and the evolution of these networks. The summary of our knowledge is presented, with a strong emphasis on the social and metacognitive pressures that deception has put on human evolution. Future research possibilities are also discussed.