Elizabeth M. Altmaier
Along with other professions, psychology engages in accreditation, a system of quality assurance to evaluate the various aspects of educating a professional psychologist. Accreditation builds on a program’s ongoing strategies of self-study and change, with the addition of a formal review that includes an on-site evaluation of the program by faculty peers from other institutions. Both site visitors and the Commission on Accreditation judge the program’s ongoing adherence to a set of standards regarding necessary content, processes, and policies. In psychology, accreditation is available for programs of study that result in the PhD and PsyD degree, for year-long internships that precede the granting of the doctoral degree, and for one or two year postdoctoral fellowships or residencies. This chapter describes the history of accreditation, outlines the current system, documents various external influences on accreditation, and considers several challenges to be met in the future.
Advances in hypnosis research: methods, designs and contributions of intrinsic and instrumental hypnosis
Rochelle E. Cox and Richard A. Bryant
Hypnosis researchers, in their continuing struggle for scientific recognition, have always been concerned about methodological techniques to convince people about the genuineness of hypnotic effects; this has been considered as a fundamental problem as hypnosis is essentially a private experience. However, this article states, the ongoing need for hypnosis researchers to be meticulous about methodology has contributed to the development of rigorous hypnotic paradigms that are consistent with contemporary scientific methods and that have both influenced and been influenced by the broader discipline of psychology. This chapter focuses on a range of experimental techniques as opposed to clinical methods. It presents some core concepts associated with hypnosis research and describes foundational research that addresses the evolving concepts. Apart from reviewing areas of current research that illustrate the core concepts in research, the article also discusses new techniques and identifies major challenges for future research in the field.
Philosophical issues with respect to anxiety and its pathological variants arise at the border between everyday and clinical understanding of anxiety, between clinical and scientific approaches and between scientific concepts and the philosophical frameworks they refer to. These four ways of understanding can be seen as epistemic levels that point at different aspects and qualities of anxiety. After a brief historical introduction the three interfaces will be discussed. Philosophical questions at the interface between the first two levels (everyday understanding and clinical knowledge) relate to the issue of where to draw the boundary between normal and pathological manifestations of anxiety and of how to balance the medical view with everyday understandings of anxiety. At the interface between clinical and scientific approaches, the question arises whether scientific theories and models are adequate, more particularly, which aspects of the clinical picture can be explained by scientific theories and concepts. The third interface, between scientific concepts and the philosophical frameworks they presuppose, is the origin of debates about what belongs to science and what should be regarded as meta-theoretical or paradigmatic. To what extent does a particular scientific concept stand on its own and to what extent does it borrow from pre-theoretical and/or philosophical views?
Fred Seymour and Raymond Nairn
The 2002 Code of Ethics for Psychologists Working in Aotearoa/New Zealand marked a major departure from its predecessor and from codes of other jurisdictions. Following the lead of the Canadian Psychological Association, an aspirational model was adopted in which guidance for ethical decision making is directly related to broad principles and related values. The code explicitly admitted the views of Māori, the indigenous people of New Zealand. As a consequence it reflects a bicultural perspective, including a shift away from an individualized conception of people and their behavior to a stronger acknowledgement of the role of community and culture in people's lives. The social and political influences on the development of this code are described.
Kenneth M. Heilman
This historical overview of aphasia represents the evolution in thought that has occurred over more than a century of studies of individuals with aphasia. The legacy of Broca and Wernicke live on in the syndromes that bear their names. We review the Wernicke–Lichtheim model that was used to predict several additional aphasia syndromes. We propose a model that encompasses modern perspectives on the Wernicke–Lichtheim models of aphasia. The aphasia syndromes that emanate from breakdown in that model also seem to be represented in recent studies of primary progressive aphasia. The framework continues to be an influential perspective for both theoretical and clinical activities to modern times.
Political and economic changes shape the development of societies in a process of dialectical feedback. Scientific and professional fields are also affected by these changes, and especially those fields that are strongly related to human sciences (Bourdieu, 1991 ). In this chapter, the influence of political matters in the development of professional psychologists’ associations in Argentina is considered. It establishes how those circumstances affected the legal status of psychology and the definition of professional competencies in the country. It also considers the particular situation of ethics codes that were being developed in the 1970s, and how the return of democracy impacted the course of action in the development of such codes in Argentina..
These comments focus on the Platonic-Aristotelian identification of mental health with virtue and mental illness with vice, which connects Plato and Aristotle directly to contemporary discussions arising out of Szasz and anti-psychiatry. It is argued that though one Aristotelian characterization of virtue-the rational adjustment of emotion (and by extension, other types of mental state) to cause and context-fits mental health exactly, Aristotle's account of mental illness as "disunity" may be questioned. First, some forms of "disunity" (such as Kleinian ambivalence) may actually be aspects of mental health. Secondly, some psychiatric disorders-notably some personality disorders-are more obviously related to vice and weak will, and therefore lie more obviously on a continuum with virtue, than others. It is also suggested that this limitation on the account of mental illness as "disunity" may have been intended by Aristotle himself.
Roderick D. Buchanan
Australian psychology has a relatively long history that mirrors the story of modern psychology in Europe and America. It was born of colonialism, and its institutional structure retains significant provincial features. The discipline had its roots in the British-style public universities in the major cites, spreading from this academic base into various applied fields. Educational and clinical psychologists spearheaded this diversification. Although independent practice has recently become more common among Australian clinicians, most nonacademic work has developed in various government programs and agencies. Teaching and research has come to refl ect an internationalist perspective, but some local and particular influences have still given it a home-grown flavor.
R. Peter Hobson
In order to understand the pathogenesis of autism, one needs to have an adequate framework within which to think about the nature of typical as well as atypical early human mental development. From a complementary perspective, the study of autism may challenge our ways of thinking about the mind itself. For example, are we justified in introducing divisions among cognition, conation, and affect in characterizing early development? What is the epistemological basis for children's understanding of others' minds? How should we think about the origins of and basis for symbolic functioning? This chapter explores the relevance of philosophy for our accounts of autism, highlighting the importance of ideas from Wittgenstein and Strawson in particular, and illustrates fresh ways in which autism might contribute to debates in philosophy of mind.
Richard Askay and Jensen Farquhar
This chapter argues for a rapprochement between Heidegger and Freud to gain a more unified, comprehensive, and holistic account of the human condition. While doing so, it explores the impact of Heidegger's philosophy on existential analysis and therapy by considering his global critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, and more specifically Freud's concepts of the Unconscious and the body. After a brief synopsis of his philosophy and its relevance for existential analysis, the chapter delineates Heidegger's critique of Freud's unconscious and considers how Binswanger, Boss, and Richardson try to preserve Freud's insights within the context of Heidegger's philosophy. The exploratory process then leads us to see bodily being as pivotal for the development of a truly holistic account of human existence. The chapter argues that Heidegger's humanism and neglect of the ontological primordiality of bodily being ultimately led him to a dualism he ubiquitously fought to avoid.