I suggest in this chapter that the uneasy fit of cities in the American political system (something that has persisted despite the fact that both cities and the American political system, and their relationships to one another, have changed dramatically over the past two centuries) might tell us something interesting about American political development. My suggestion fits into the strain of historical institutionalist research that sees institutional ‘friction’ or ‘intercurrence’ as key to explaining significant change over time. It diverges, however, from the dominant traditions within the study of American urban politics. I provide an overview of these dominant traditions, and I then suggest how viewing cities as ill-fitting elements within American political development might open up new avenues for researching the relationships between cities and American political thought, federalism, and the construction of political roles and identities.
Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres
This article focuses on the Lisbon Strategy. The Lisbon Strategy, developed at subsequent meetings of the European Council, outlines an economic and social strategy meant to relaunch the EU within the changed context of worldwide competition and the paradigm shift to a knowledge economy and an innovation-based model of growth. The economic pillar was to create the basis for the transition to a competitive, dynamic knowledge-based economy, with emphasis on the need to adapt constantly to changes in the information society and to increase research and development. The social pillar was to modernize the European social model, investing in human resources and combating social exclusion. The environmental pillar, added at the Gothenburg European Council meeting in June 2001, called attention to the need to decouple economic growth from natural resource utilization for sustainable development.
Marcus Owens and Jennifer Wolch
The study of nonhuman animals in urban ecosystems is a recent but expanding field. This chapter explores the ways in which human-animal relationships in cities have historically been framed and argues that a consideration of nonhuman animals is vital to a robust urban theory in the age of ecology. The places of animals within the urban planning and design professions that shape cities are elucidated, along with contemporary developments in ecology that increasingly inform city planning, design, and management. The chapter then highlights four global dynamics that promise to radically reshape urban animal ecologies, and concludes with a call for lively cities characterized by the coexistence of people and animals.
Environmentalism should deal with the environment, meaning that which environs us; instead it too frequently deals with “nature.” If the latter term means that part of the world that humans haven’t transformed, the trouble is that nature doesn’t environ us: in the Anthropocene, we’re surrounded by an environment that humans have built. An environmentalism of the built environment would worry about why we’ve built it so badly, and would focus on the phenomenon of “reification,” whereby the actual practices of humans in constructing their world are hidden and the things and institutions surrounding us come to seem like “facts of nature.” Environmental problems are not problems about nature: they are social and political problems about how human practices ought to be organized and about the norms by which those practices ought to be guided.
Bruce F. Berg
This article investigates the range of state-city relations in order to evaluate the state's impact on the city as well as the city's ability to influence state governance. New York City is a unit of local government in New York State. New York City needed state legislature to approve parkland alienation for the building of the new Yankee Stadium. A major part of what makes New York State–New York City relations unique is the degree of influence that New York City has at the state level. Despite the natural rivalry between the two offices, mayors and governors from different parties, or positions on the political spectrum, do not necessarily experience heightened conflict. Relations between a specific mayor and governor can also change over time. New York City remains one of many New York State local governments and must function within this framework.
Within a period of thirteen months, the heads of state of Italy, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries signed two treaties, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April 1951 and the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) in May 1952 (known as the Treaties of Paris). This article aims to shed light on four debates or ‘fault lines’ in the literature on the ECSC and EDC treaties. It contrasts ‘materialist’ accounts of preference formation – emphasizing economic and geopolitical conditions – with constructivist accounts of preference formation stressing the subjective interpretations of material conditions. The article discusses the dynamics of interstate bargaining, and the sources of ratification successes and failures. These accounts employ – implicitly or explicitly – a rationalist bargaining approach, but disagree on whether actors' bargaining power is more centrally affected by domestic or systemic sources. Finally, the article turns to a body of literature exploring the question of institutional design. What prompted policymakers to opt for a supranational organization in the cases of the ECSC and the EDC? The fault line in this section pits proponents of functionalist and rationalist explanations for institutional design against constructivism-inspired institutionalist accounts emphasizing the legitimacy-enhancing effects of institutional choices.
On 25 March 1957, in the course of an imposing ceremony in Rome, the representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany signed a treaty instituting a European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) and a second accord establishing a European Community in Atomic Energy (Euratom). This article begins with a discussion of the processes that led to the signature of the Rome Treaties, and then considers the significance of the treaties. The striking feature of the Treaties of Rome, and the negotiation process that preceded them, is the novel willingness of the Six to subordinate their traditional sovereign rights. This perception of mutual interest ultimately derived from their leaders' judgment that they would not count in the world unless they colluded. At bottom, the Treaties of Rome derived from a shrewd assessment by the Six's leaders of their nations' diminished standing in the world and a shared determination that they would make ‘Europe’ matter again.
Like any political system, the EU was not built in one day, but its institutional structure, common policies, and rules have gradually been shaped on a day-to day basis, with regular moments of consolidation and reform at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). Between the signature of the Rome Treaties (1957) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), there was only one IGC, leading to the SEA (1987). In contrast, in the period 1991–2000 there were three IGCs, leading to the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice respectively. Following a brief introduction on the preparatory stage of the 1996–1997 IGC, this article starts by giving an overview of its main players. Secondly, it examines the main themes that were discussed and presents the results. The conclusion takes stock of the outcome and presents some final remarks on how to make sense of the Amsterdam IGC.
The Treaty of Maastricht, which created the EU, was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993 after being ratified by the then twelve member states of the European Communities. This article discusses how the treaty was adopted, the economic and monetary union, the main policy changes, the new pillars, the main institutional changes, the ratification of Maastricht, and the significance of Maastricht.
Alberta M. Sbragia
The Treaty of Nice will be viewed in the history of European integration as a ‘hinge’ between the ‘old’ EU of fifteen West European states and the ‘new’ EU of twenty-seven or more states symbolized by the Lisbon Treaty. This article discusses the background to the Treaty of Nice and the context within which it was negotiated. It then discusses the actors, lays out the most contentious issues that had to be addressed, and concludes with the dynamics of bargaining.