- Fascism in the Middle East and North Africa
- The Yemeni Uprising: A Product of Twenty Years of Grassroots Mobilization
- The “New Turkey” At Home and Abroad
- Fiscal Crisis and Structural Change in the Late Ottoman Economy
- The Arab Uprisings of 2011 in Historical Perspective
- Political Movements in Bahrain Across the Long Twentieth Century (1900–2015)
- After Gaddafi: Libya’s Path to Collapse
- Syria’s Economic History: Bumpy Road from Economic Nationalism to Neoliberalism
- Toward New Approaches to the Anthropology of Islamic Movements: Women’s Islamic Activism and the Question of Subjectivity
- Capital, Labor, and State: Rethinking the Political Economy of Oil in the Gulf
- Kemalism and Beyond
- Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
- Arab Youth: Disruptive Generation of the Twenty-first Century?
- The Emergence of Nationalism
- Sextarianism: Notes on Studying the Lebanese State
- The Levant Mandates
- Dodging the Peril of Peace: Israel and the Arabs in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War
- The First World War and its Legacy in the Middle East
- Before the Spring: Shifting Patterns of Protest in Rural Egypt
- Cascading Liberation and Renewal—Tunisia in History
- Reliving Tragedies as Historical Reawakenings: Modern Iran and Its Revolutions
- A War over the People: The Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962
- Constitutional Revolutions and State Formations in Comparison: Iran and Turkey
- Contemporary Israel/Palestine
- The Crisis of Sovereignty, Ruptured Domination, and the Kurdish Quest for Democratic Self-Government in Syria
- The Matter of Sectarianism
- Environmental History of the Middle East and North Africa
- The Fragmentation of Gender in Post-Invasion Iraq
- W(h)ither Arabian Peninsula Studies?
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines the colonial roots of counterinsurgency practices deployed by the US after September 11, 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on a broad range of primary sources produced by the US military and its officers and soldiers, the chapter argues that the counterinsurgency practices were intended as liberal forms of warfare that through the use of law, administration, and procedure intended to facilitate the conquest and management of intransigent populations in those two countries. Given the broader failure of such practices to pacify the conquered populations and the high cost-in blood, treasure, and political credibility—of maintaining such futile warfare, the US has now changed gears to counterterrorism, which is far more about direct violence than it is about imperial management and transformation of conquered populations.
Laleh Khalili, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
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