- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance
- The History of Corporate Governance
- Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions
- An International Corporate Governance Index
- Boards and Governance: 25 Years of Qualitative Research with Directors of FTSE Companies
- Process Matters: Understanding Board Behavior and Effectiveness
- Board Committees
- The Governance of Director Networks
- Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: What Do We “Know” and Where Are We Going?
- Corporate Governance: Ownership Interests, Incentives, and Conflicts
- Financial Leverage and Corporate Governance
- Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance
- Auditing and Corporate Governance
- The Market for Corporate Control
- The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in High-Tech Firms
- Family Business and Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in IPOs
- Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and Internationalization
- Corporate Governance in Business Groups
- Governance in Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
- Venture Capital and Corporate Governance
- Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts, and Corporate Governance
- Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Governance
- The Financial Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds
- Corporate Governance and Nonprofits: Facing up to Hybridization and Homogenization
- Corporate Governance and Labor
- Corporate Governance and Principal–Principal Conflicts
- Multiple Agency Theory: An Emerging Perspective on Corporate Governance
- An Age of Corporate Governance Failure?: Financialization and its Limits
- Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter addresses the argument that there are three primary actors in corporate governance: owners, managers, and labor. The discussion centers on the effects of governance regimes and practices on labor and the role of labor in corporate governance. It studies the perspectives on corporate governance regimes and identifies the possible ways labor is involved in governance. The chapter also includes a model that features the impacts of corporate governance on labor, and which also shows how governance can affect rewards, industrial relations, employment, work organization, industrial relations, and skills development.
Andrew Pendleton, York Management School, University of York
Howard Gospel is Professor of Management at King's College, University of London; a Research Associate at the Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics; and a Fellow of the Said Business School, University of Oxford, all in the UK. His research interests include the development of employer labor policy, corporate governance and human resource management, forms of employee representation, and training and development. He has published widely on these topics in historical and contemporary contexts, often with an international and comparative perspective.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.