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date: 21 March 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Monism about truth is the view that there is precisely one way of being true. Nihilism about truth is the view that there is no such thing as being true. Pluralism about truth is the view that there are several ways of being true. For the pluralist, truth is Many; in particular, different ways of being true apply to different domains of discourse. The way in which propositions about physics may be true could differ from the way in which the propositions of morality may be true. This chapter provides an introduction to truth pluralism and offers a brief survey of different incarnations of the view. It discusses whether different kinds of pluralist have the resources adequately to address the various challenges and objections, and ends with a brief discussion of what connections, if any, pluralism about truth might bear to other kinds of pluralism.

Keywords: truth pluralism, strong truth pluralism, moderate truth pluralism, truth monism, realism/anti-realism debate, correspondence, superwarrant, mixed discourse, logical pluralism, ontological pluralism

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