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date: 20 April 2019

Abstract and Keywords

When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. In this truistic but influential thought lies the germ of the identity theory of truth. For, in the broadest terms, the identity theory holds that truth is a matter of identity between how things are and how one takes them to be. Giving such a theory substantive content, however, requires the specification of a pair of candidate entities for identification. The early sections of this chapter consider identity theories based on the most frequently proposed pair of entities, namely facts and propositions, focusing in particular on whether such theories can steer between the Scylla of mere truism and the Charybdis of absurdity (such as making falsehood impossible). The final sections briefly examine the connections between the identity theory of truth and quietism, on the one hand, and monistic idealism on the other.

Keywords: disjunctivism, facts, idealism, identity theory of truth, propositions, quietism, states of affairs, truth, truth-bearers, truth-makers

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