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date: 22 April 2019

Abstract and Keywords

The concept of intuitive judgment is traditionally associated with the heuristics and biases research of Kahneman, Tversky, and others. Within this paradigm, subjective probabilities are numerical expressions of beliefs concerning uncertain events that may be assessed using heuristics that reduce complex computational tasks to simpler judgmental ones. Such intuitive judgments can be economical and effective, but they accrue negative outcomes when rules for inference are used which are founded on false assumptions or when errors of logic are used which have attendant biases. Intuitive judgments based upon the heuristics of representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment can be useful, but they may also lead to severe and systematic errors. However, as well as the “heuristics and biases” perspective, intuition has been viewed from a variety of different standpoints, some of which are summarized in this article.

Keywords: intuitive judgment, heuristics, biases, organizational decision making, representativeness, systematic errors

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