- Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy
- Animals and Ethics in the History of Modern Philosophy
- Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account
- Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Animals
- A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals
- Utilitarianism and Animals
- Rights Theory and Animal Rights
- The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements
- The Idea of Moral Standing
- Animals, Fundamental Moral Standing, and Speciesism
- Human Animals and Nonhuman Persons
- Are Nonhuman Animals Persons?
- Animal Mentality: Its Character, Extent, and Moral Significance
- Mindreading and Moral Significance in Nonhuman Animals
- Minimal Minds
- Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
- Animal Pain and Welfare: Can Pain Sometimes Be Worse for Them than for Us?
- Animals That Act for Moral Reasons
- The Moral Life of Animals
- On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations
- On the Nature of Species and the Moral Significance of their Extinction
- Are All Species Equal?
- Genetically Modified Animals: Should There Be Limits to Engineering the Animal Kingdom?
- Human/Nonhuman Chimeras: Assessing the Issues
- The Moral Relevance of the Distinction Between Domesticated and Wild Animals
- The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death
- The Ethics of Confining Animals: From Farms to Zoos to Human Homes
- Keeping Pets
- Animal Experimentation in Biomedical Research
- Ethical Issues in the Application of Biotechnology to Animals in Agriculture
- Environmental Ethics, Hunting, and the Place of Animals
- The Use of Animals in Toxicological Research
- What's Ethics Got to Do with it?: The Roles of Government Regulation in Research-Animal Protection
- Literary Works and Animal Ethics
Abstract and Keywords
This article starts with the assumption that the term “person” in the everyday sense is generally taken to be synonymous with the term “human”. Philosophers tend to use the word “person” in the more abstract sense of entities as someone who possess a particular moral status and about whom particular moral claims may be made on the basis of that status. This article considers whether a nonhuman animal or any other entity could, under certain specifiable conditions, be a person. It approaches this subject through personhood theory and asks why certain attributes are thought so important to being a person. It then asks what this account requires of nonhuman animals in order to be deemed persons. It also explores the implications of nonhuman animal personhood.
Sarah Chan, Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, The University of Manchester, UK
John Harris is Sir David Alliance Professor of Bioethics at the Institute of Medicine, Law, and Bioethics, University of Manchester. In 2001 he was the first philosopher to have been elected a Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences. He has been a member of the Human Genetics Commission since its foundation in 1999. The author or editor of fourteen books and over 150 papers, his recent books include Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 2001), A Companion to Genetics: Philosophy and the Genetic Revolution, co‐edited with Justine Burley (Blackwell, 2002), and On Cloning (Routledge, 2004).
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