- The Pyrrhonian Problematic
- The Problem of the Criterion
- Cartesian Skepticism: Arguments and Antecedents
- Hume's Skepticism
- Skepticism about the External World
- Skepticism about Induction
- Skepticism about A Priori Justification: Self‐Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions
- Moral Realism, Quasi Realism, and Skepticism
- Religious Skepticism
- Live Skeptical Hypotheses
- Berkeley's Treatment of Skepticism
- Kant's Response to Skepticism
- Reid's Response to the Skeptic
- Peirce and Skepticism
- Moore and Skepticism
- Austin's Way with Skepticism
- Wittgenstein on Certainty
- The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism
- Ascriber Contextualism
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Antiluck Epistemology
- Closure and Alternative Possibilities
- Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma
- Externalist Responses to Skepticism
- Internalist Responses to Skepticism
- Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism
- Disjunctivism and Skepticism
Abstract and Keywords
This article describes the relationship of skepticism with moral and quasi realism. It discusses the main reason why quasi realists believe that they can explain and justify the realist-seeming appearances of ordinary moral thought and discourse. It explains the distinction among the three different varieties of quasi realism and argues that none of them provide a more satisfactory job of explaining the acquisition of moral knowledge than robust realism. It concludes that some varieties of quasi realism fail to comport with platitudes central to our ordinary understanding of knowledge, while others do comport but fail to explain the acquisition of moral knowledge in a way that is more illuminating than robust realism.
Terence Cuneo is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vermont. His work focuses primarily on contemporary metaethics and history of modern philosophy. He is the author of The Normative Web (Oxford, 2007) and the co-editor of The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid (Cambridge, 2004).
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