- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter probes the implications of Kantian ethics concerning procreative decisions that involve offspring with intellectual disability. The chapter argues that selecting against embryos or early fetuses that would develop intellectual disabilities does not typically fail to respect persons’ dignity, according to one partial reconstruction of Kant’s Formula of Humanity. The chapter then disputes Paul Hurley and Rivka Weinberg’s contention that in some “nonidentity” cases involving offspring with disability parents treat their child merely as a means and thereby wrong her. David Wasserman claims inspiration from the Formula of Humanity in developing a necessary condition for morally permissible procreation. The chapter urges rejecting this condition for embracing it sometimes implausibly implies that in producing a child with intellectual disability, parents contravene the spirit of the Formula of Humanity.
Samuel Kerstein, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, works in bioethics, ethical theory, and Kant. He is the author of Kant’s Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality (2002) and How to Treat Persons (2013), as well as articles on treating people merely as means, markets in organs, and the just distribution of scarce, life-saving resources.
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