- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines conceptual, methodological, and epistemological questions in debates about the moral status of people with intellectual disabilities. It begins with a call for conceptual clarity and specificity when philosophizing about intellectual disability. The chapter then goes on to address the many references to nonhuman animals in discussions of intellectual disability and moral status. It considers what is at stake in drawing such comparisons and whether such arguments contribute to the dehumanization of people with intellectual disabilities. It concludes with an exploration of how critical, reparative, and generative philosophies of intellectual disability can move beyond current approaches to moral status.
Licia Carlson, Professor of Philosophy at Providence College, has focused much of her research on philosophy and intellectual disability. Her interests include bioethics, feminist philosophy, 20th century French philosophy, and the philosophy of music. She is the author of The Faces of Intellectual Disability: Philosophical Reflections (2010), and co-edited Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy with Eva Kittay (2010) and Phenomenology and the Arts with Peter Costello (2016).
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